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Abstract
The use of a neutral party to intercede between two or more disputing
parties with the goal of facilitating a mutually-acceptable resolution,
settlement, or agreement-i.e., mediation-has never been critically
evaluated as a possible procedure within the field of military criminal
justice. This article explores whether mediation may march alongside
orthodox criminal procedure-as it does in civilian jurisdictions-without
undervaluing traditional philosophies that guide military justice, and without
undermining traditional sources of prosecutorial authority: military
commanders. Current military doctrine (both operational and legal)
supports non-traditional problem-solving systems, of which mediation should
be considered a part. Relation-based misconduct provides the most
appropriate candidate of crime particularly ripe for mediation within
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military units, especially when framed against a genuine and historically-
justifiable command interest in preserving or repairing "unit cohesion."
While pragmatic and legal counter-arguments against mediation are
reasonably sound, there is nothing intrinsic to the military scheme ofjustice
that makes them any more persuasive. Rather, when translated into a
military culture, these criticisms and concerns reflect the same underlying
tensions between traditional prosecutorial authority, efficiency, victim rights,
and preventive law. Ultimately, whether in the form of a system that directly
employs mediation parallel to orthodox justice, or in the form of a new skill
set for military leaders employed indirectly as part of their routine
leadership functions, mediation need not be considered alien nor an
anathema to current military justice as exercised by military commanders.
I. Overview
II. Justifications
A. "Relational Misconduct"
B. Damaged Unit Cohesion: a Community Effect (and Source) of
Relational Misconduct
C. "Victim-Offender" and "Administrative" Mediation Systems for
Avoiding and Repairing Harmful Community Effects
III. Nesting Mediation Within Orthodox Military Justice
A. Traditional Military Justice
1. Orthodox Military Justice focuses on Discipline, Order, and
Justice and cognizant of need for Operational Flexibility
2. Military Justice is Command-Directed, Permitting Potential
Bridges to Non-Traditional Approaches
B. Current Institutionalized Processes Allow for Innovation
1. Manual for Courts-Martial
2. Composite Risk Management and Design
C. Mediation for "Relational Misconduct": Re-framing Rule for Court-
Martial 306 for a Mediation Decision
IV. A Prospective Framework and Plausible Concerns
A. Prospective Framework: a "Commander's Alternative Mediation
Program"
1. Scope
2. Elements
3. Open Questions
B. Mediation and its Discontents: addressing plausible military-specific
constraints and criticism
1. The Infringement Argument
2. The Blurry Heuristic Argument
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3. The Cloaking Misconduct Argument
4. The Underdeveloped Law Argument
5. The Superfluous Argument
6. The Redundant Argument
V. Conclusion
I. OVERVIEW
Military justice has a distinct flavor, tone, and appearance from civilian
criminal justice.' Traditionally, and for sound reasons, military justice is
constructed around, and premised on, unilateral authority and hierarchical
procedures. That is, decisions about who to prosecute, how to prosecute, or
whether to prosecute are the responsibility of commanders rather than
prosecutors or independent grand juries.2 Even if not universally admired,
the rationale driving this "command-centric" 3 justice system is readily
See, e.g., Manual for Courts-Martial, United States Part I (Preamble), 1-1 (2008)
[hereinafter MCM], ("The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby strengthen the national security of
the United States."). One of the broadest criminal offenses in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice is Article 134, which outlines fifty-two distinct specific and general
intent crimes that contain the necessary element of "under the circumstances, the conduct
of the accused was to the prejudice of the good order and discipline in the armed forces
or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." See, e.g., UCMJ Article 134
(Disloyal statements), Article 134 (Debt, dishonorably failing to pay), or Article 134
(Self-Injury without intent to avoid service). These victimless crimes are crimes because
they impugn the reputation and public image of the military services. See also Eugene R.
Fidell, Accountability, Transparency, & Public Confidence in the Administration of
Military Justice, 9 GREEN BAG 361, 362-63 (2006) (noting the contrast between
"standing" civilian trial courts and military trial courts, observing that the absence of a
permanent "clerk's office" in the latter decreases public awareness and scrutiny of
pending criminal dockets; also noting that the availability and ease of non-judicial
punishment makes it a common sanction "typically shrouded from public view" and thus
important information about misconduct, the offender, the victim, and the decision-
making process are not readily transparent).
2 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 22-24, 26 (10 U.S.C. §§ 822-824 (2012))
[hereinafter UCMJ]; MCM, Rules for Court-Martial 303, 306, and 307 (2012)
[hereinafter R.C.M.].
3 Fidell, supra note 1, at 364-65 (arguing for, inter alia, prosecutorial oversight of
commanders' disposition decision to dampen what he believes to be the inconsistencies
and unfairness of "command-by-command disparities").
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understandable. 4 To effectively command a military organization or unit,
whose members comprise the legal jurisdiction of that commander, one must
be charged with maintaining the internal discipline of that group. One cannot
maintain such discipline without the authority and mechanisms to dispose of
criminal matters efficiently and-if needed-under the adverse conditions of
combat.
This article asks whether similarly-accepted principles can justify a
commander's decision to abstain from exercising unilateral military justice-
like nonjudicial punishment or pursuing courts-martial-in favor of a less-
structured, multi-lateral dispute resolution process. Under what conditions
might this be appropriate? Under what framework-if not traditional
military justice-would such problem solving occur? This article suggests
that broken unit cohesion is one condition and that a tailored blend of
mediation systems-victim-offender (i.e., criminal) and administrative (i.e.,
employment-focused) mediation-provides that framework.5
Though different in context, both criminal victim-offender mediation
systems and administrative mediation processes share common themes in
their practical components and theoretical perspectives. These alternative
forums of conflict resolution insert a neutral third-party mediator to facilitate
the voluntary and direct contact between aggrieved parties to avert
adversarial "relationship-busting" 6 processes and consequences. Mediation's
proponents and researchers have found its benefits to be both quantifiable
and intangible: effective de-clogging of crowded court dockets, 7 a less-
4 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974) (observing that the "differences
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that 'it is the primary
business of armies and navies to fight or ready to fight wars should the occasion arise"')
(quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
5 This article will focus on interpersonal conflict's damaging effect on unit cohesion
as the justification for mediation. Other common justifications-e.g., cost-effectiveness
or judicial economy-may also support this argument, but deserve their own thorough
analysis as to whether they support mediation in a military justice context.
6 Task Force on Improving Mediation Quality Final Report, ABA SEC. OF DisP.
RESOL., Appendix D at 32 (Apr. 2006-Feb. 2008), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/201 1 build/disputeresolution/finaltaskforcemediation.aut
hcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA DR].
7 Mark W. Bakker, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant:
Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1485 (1993); Larysa
Simms, Criminal Mediation is the BASF of the Criminal Justice System: Not Replacing
Traditional Criminal Adjudication, Just Making it Better, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
797, 802-806 (2007). The Prosecution Resources Unit Mediation Program, run by the
City Attorney's Office in Columbus, Ohio, estimates that "hundreds" of cases per year
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combative atmosphere than in-court litigation,8 emotional catharsis, cost-
effectiveness, the preservation of relationships, 9 satisfaction with the
process,' 0 increased flexibility, and the shifting of responsibility for the
process and outcome to those most affected by the dispute." Of course,
unconventionally resolving conflicts laden with legal implications that affect
rights and duties-presumed attributes aside-bears its own challenges.
Most notably, questions of traditional legal and ethical norms (whether they
apply, whether they should be guides, or whether they should be avoided),
considerations of fairness and due process, availability of representation,
equal access to the process, finality, reviewability, confidentiality,
impartiality, and asymmetric bargaining positions' 2 are the recurring and oft-
debated concerns raised about the purpose, design, and efficacy of mediation
systems.
Despite mediation's well-researched dynamics in civil grievances and
criminal cases, 13 military criminal law academics and practitioners have
largely ignored the question of its fitness for resolving service-member
criminal misconduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Instead, the military-specific legal literature abounds with analysis of
are successfully diverted from the city's criminal docket. See email from Robert S.
Tobias, Senior Assistant City Attorney and Director, Prosecution Resources Unit,
Columbus, Ohio, May 17, 2012, to the author (on file with the author). In 2011, the
Department of Justice calculated that the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(including mediation when appropriate) within its pending case-load across the United
States saved 1,231 months of litigation effort (as defined by the number of months that
cases would have remained docketed with federal courts had the dispute resolution
process failed or not been initiated), and 14,656 days of attorney and staff time. See
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
http://www.justice.gov/olp/adr/doj-statistics.htm.
8 Bakker, supra note 7, at 1480.
9 ABA DR Final Report, supra note 6, at 32.
10 Mark S. Umbreit, Restorative Justice Through Victim-Offender Mediation: A
Multi-Site Assessment, 1 W. CRIMINOLOGY REv. 1, at Table 9 (1998). See also Stephanos
Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 116-17 (2004).
11 What You Need to Know About Dispute Resolution: The Guide to Dispute
Resolution Processes, ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (2006), available at
http://www.amercicanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute resolution/
draftprocedure.authcheckdam.pdf.
12 See, e.g., Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEG. L. REv. 123, 126-29 (2008).
13 See generally Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or
Foe? A Systemic Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667
(2005); Bakker, supra note 7.
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mediation in civil disputes: contract and procurement processes, consumer
and lessee complaints, and employee-employer conflict over equal
opportunity and discrimination matters (generally, discussing civilian
employees of the Department of Defense, not uniformed service-members
subject to the UCMJ). 14 This paucity of scholarship is coupled with the
scarcity of practical application. Despite hundreds of documented victim-
offender mediation programs in the United States alone, 15 official
presidential promotion of non-litigious dispute resolution systems within the
14 See, e.g., Colonel Alfred F. Arquilla, The New Army Legal Assistance Regulation,
ARMY LAW., May 1993, at 3; Holly Cook, Leader Development: Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Working with Union Employees, ARMY LAW., Oct./Nov. 2002, at 13;
John E. Hartsell, The Sounds ofSilence: Promoting Alternative Dispute Resolution in Air
Force Procurement by Putting Confidence into Confidentiality, 53 A.F. L. REv. 183
(2002); Bernard P. Ingold, An Overview and Analysis of the New Rules of Professional
Conduct for Army Lawyers, 124 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1989); OTJAG [Office of The Judge
Advocate General] Standards of Conduct Professional Responsibility Note, Ethical
Awareness, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1991, at 58; Major Michael B. Richardson, The
Department of the Navy's Equal Opportunity Complaint Dispute Resolution Process
Pilot Program: A Bold Experiment that Deserves Further Exploration, 169 MIL. L. REV.
1 (2001); Captain Drew Swank, Mediation and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Complaint Process, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1998, at 46; Major Timothy J. Tuttle, Three's A
Crowd: Why Mandating Union Representative at Mediation of Federal Employees'
Discrimination Complaints is Illegal and Contrary to Legislative Intent, 62 A.F. L. REV.
127 (2008); Major Sherry R. Wetsch, Alternative Dispute Resolution-An Introduction
for Legal Assistance Attorneys, ARMY LAW., June 2000, at 8.
15 Mediation sessions, bringing together the victim and perpetrator of a crime, vary
greatly in their sponsorship or point of origin: some are trial diversions screened by
prosecutors' offices or redirected by courts; others are formed in the aftermath of
punishment as part of conciliatory reconciliation triggered by parole offices; still others
are generated by private civic or religious organizations under a philosophy of
"restorative justice." See, e.g., Mediation in Criminal Matters: Survey of ADR and
Restorative Justice Programs (sponsored by the ABA Criminal Justice Section, Section
of Dispute Resolution, Section of State and Local Government Law, Standing Committee
on Legal Aid and Indigent Defense, Government and Public Sector Lawyers Division,
Commission on Domestic Violence, and Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/criminaljustice/
mediationsurvey.authcheckdam.pdf. See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/restorative-justice/promising-practices/victim-offender-
mediation.html; VICTIM-OFFENDER RECONCILIATION PROGRAM INFORMATION AND
RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.vorp.com/articles/abaendors.html.
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Executive Branch for the last three administrations,16 endorsement by the
American Bar Association, and a statutorily-created Alternative Dispute
Resolution Coordinating Committee within the Department of Defense,17 no
such program, process, or even policy guidance exists to address mediation-
ripe criminal misconduct in a population of more than two million uniformed
members of the Armed Forces against the ever-present backdrop of the
existing military criminal code.' 8 Whether mediation is consistent with,
improves, or detracts from the unique culture and law of the UCMJ is a
question currently unaddressed.
As explored below, the lack of attention mediation has received is not
entirely surprising in light of the purpose and historical application of
military criminal law focusing on expediency and discipline. It is even less
surprising in light of a prosecutorial decision-making system that is self-
consciously and deliberately commander-centric. Moreover, the class of
interpersonal misconduct most apt for a mediated resolution usually fails to
capture headlines or the necessarily-sporadic attention of uniformed officer-
lawyers' 9 working within military justice. Instead, mass homicides on
stateside installations or committed in a combat theater; hazing-related
suicides; battlefield misconduct; purported race-based bias in the application
of the death penalty; and intrinsic challenges in the prosecution of alleged
sexual assaults are the military justice issues attracting the most attention
from lawmakers, the public, and within the military.20
16 See Memorandum on Agency Use of Alternate Means of Dispute Resolution and
Negotiated Rulemaking, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 749 (May 1, 1998), available at
www.opm.gov/er/adrguide/Appendix-p2-3.asp.
17 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (2012), Pub. L. 104-320 (Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1996); see also www.adr.gov, and www.dod.gov/dodgc/Ic/.
18 For statistical reporting on the Armed Forces' population, see "Population
Representation in the Military Services: 2010" (Report of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness), available at http://prhome.defense.gov.
Generally, active duty members of the military are universally subject to the UCMJ's
jurisdiction, regardless of territorial jurisdiction in which the crime occurs and regardless
of whether the crime has a service connection. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 802, 803, and 805
(2012); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (enlarging military jurisdiction,
altering its basis from a service connection of the crime to a jurisdiction based solely on
the military status of the accused).
19 Hereinafter, this article will refer to Judge Advocates as those uniformed
members of the Armed Forces licensed to practice law in the United States and serving as
legal advisors within their respective Services' Judge Advocate General Corps.
20 See, e.g., Associated Press, Pretrial Hearing Set for Fort Hood Shooting Suspect;
Defense Requesting Another Expert, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2012,
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Yet, recurring threats to good order and discipline faced by the average
military commander are not these attention-grabbing "black swan" events. 21
Rather, they are the day-to-day grievances and interpersonal frictions
between service-members that-if left untended-spark on various levels:
harm to a victim, the punitive consequences on the perpetrator, and the time
and effort drained from the command as it undergoes or leads an
investigation and prepares for a court-martial or administrative action. Unit
cohesion also weakens when interpersonal friction leads to what this article
will refer to as "relation-based" or "relational" misconduct. As a fundamental
corollary to a military commander's charge to enforce good order and
discipline, sustaining unit cohesion in the wake of relation-based misconduct
is a military duty that could drive commanders toward non-traditional means,
like mediation, for resolving this type of crime in the ranks. 22
At its core, carving out a distinct set of crime and labeling it as
"relational misconduct" is nothing more than a common-sense observation
that some interpersonal crimes disrupt the community in which the victim
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/pretrial-hearing-set-for-fort-hood-shooting-
suspect-defense-requesting-another-expert/2012/04/02/gIQAXY8CrS_story.html
(regarding the mass shooting that resulted in 13 deaths and 31 wounded personnel on Fort
Hood in November 2009); Kim Murphy, Afghanistan Shooting Suspect Named: Army
Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-afghanistan-shooting-suspect-
20120316,0,1113958.story (regarding the alleged cold-blooded murder of more than a
dozen Afghan villagers); Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., Senior Enlisted Leaders
Condemn Hazing in Military, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.army.mil/article/76366/ (regarding, in part, the Army's response to the
alleged hazing-related suicide of Private Danny Chen on October 3, 2011); Editorial, The
Military and the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/opinion/the-military-and-the-death-penalty.html;
Memorandum from The Judge Advocate General to Judge Advocate Legal Services
Personnel, subject: Special Victim Prosecutors-Policy Memorandum 09-03 (29 May
2009), available at https://www.jagcnet2.army.mil/852573690045COBB/0/
93AEBBB34AC5388585257809004DCB9A?opendocument (on file with the author);
Major General (Retired) Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Bad Policies Breed Bad Behavior in
Modern Battlefield Situations, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 22, 2012,
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/04/bad_policies-breed-bad-behavior.
html.
21 NASsIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE xxii-xxiii (2010) (defining a "black swan" event as an occurrence that is
exceptionally rare ("a statistical "outlier") yet carries "extreme impact" and for which
human nature compels a sense of a "retrospective" predictability).
22 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, Army Command Policy 1-5c, 2-1,
and 4-1 (18 Mar. 2008).
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and offender find themselves. 23 This realization, then, implicates a favored
maxim within the philosophy of mediation: certain forms of non-traditional
justice are normatively better-suited when all parties agree that the stakes and
goals involve more than retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation of the
offender.24  Repairing military unit cohesion, then, is fundamentally
comparable to the positive effects on workplace climate, employee
satisfaction, and intra-community trust pursued by advocates of mediation.
With that as a premise, this article introduces two relative strangers to
each other for the first time: mediation and military justice. The intent is
modest: to explore the conditions under which these two adjudicatory paths
may function side-by-side without breaching core tenets of traditional
military justice. But, as scholars of mediation have noted, marrying up a
dispute or conflict with a suitable venue or process can be a daunting
challenge.25 Viewing mediation as a stake-holder driven, risk managing
"corrective measure," notably within the customary discretion of
commanders, this article will then examine that class of misconduct that
might be ripe for mediation. It then offers a rationale-repairing unit
cohesion-for justifying a commander's choice to rely on mediation as an
alternative venue for solving a disciplinary problem. To better frame this
reconceptualization of what military justice could be, this article will
demonstrate that both operational doctrine and current military criminal
procedure are, in fact, permissive enough to allow for innovative exploration
of unorthodox justice.26
After discussing the strengths and weaknesses of various military-
specific counterarguments, this article concludes with a brief look at how
mediation might find its way into military justice through straightforward
23 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 10, at 109.
24 Gabriel Hallevy, Therapeutic Victim-Offender Mediation Within the Criminal
Justice Process-Sharpening the Evaluation of Personal Potential for Rehabilitation
While Righting Wrongs Under the ADR Philosophy, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 65, 74
(2011).
25 Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach,
11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
26 By first looking at the parties' characteristics and goals, to include the obvious
interests of the encapsulating military community, and only then searching for an
appropriate forum, this tack follows Sander and Goldberg's approach of "fitting the
forum to the fuss" rather than the reverse. Id. at 6-7 (citing to Frank E. A. Sander and
Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting
an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994)).
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pedagogical means rather than through a systems-design approach. In the
appendix, this article will propose several "tracks" in which mediation can be
envisioned as a potential partner to orthodox military justice methods, as well
as highlighting potential issues that are worth exploring in greater detail.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Relational Misconduct
Relational crime or misconduct is that class of military criminal offense
that meets two criteria. First, an intrinsic feature of the relationship between
the offender and the victim constitutes one or more factors triggering the
commission of the offense. Second, the effect of the crime is limited to an
emotional or physical injury to another service-member. Simply, both the
cause and the effect of the misconduct are "relational."
The purpose of defining "relational" crime in this way is to narrow the
field of potential application to those areas in which mediation has the
greatest opportunity for resolution. For instance, a crime whose only victim
was-in a sense-the government (e.g., false official statements, obstruction
of justice, dereliction of duty, fraudulent claims, absent without leave, to
name a few) are foreclosed from this particular class of crime and would not
be the proper subject of a mediated solution, at least as envisioned in this
article. In contrast, minor assaults between roommates in the barracks, 27
insubordinate contempt or disrespectful language toward a non-
commissioned officer,28 dishonorably failing to honor a personal debt,29 and
communicating a threat30 could be examples of such relational misconduct.31
27 UCMJ art. 128 (2012). In particular, "simple assaults" and "assaults
consummated by a battery" without punishment enhancers or aggravators. See MCM, pt.
IV, 54b(1) and (2).
28 UCMJ art. 91 (2012). See MCM, pt. IV, 15a(3).
29 UCMJ art. 134 (2012). See MCM, pt. IV, 171.
30 UCMJ art. 134 (2012). See MCM, pt. IV, 1 10.
31 Admittedly, this broad definition leaves several questions unanswered: it does not
further define "emotional or physical injury," so-arguably-it encompasses everything
from an insulting word to a gunshot wound; it also does not purport to explain how to
determine what the triggering factors are. These omissions are deliberate. I believe they
are necessary in order to properly recognize the ultimate discretion afforded to
commanders as decision-makers in military justice: allowing commanders (or their
designees) the fundamental opportunity to determine whether the causes of the
misconduct are relationship-centric, and thus potentially ripe for mediation. This
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One common denominator featured in all relational misconduct, and which
offers a prospective rationale for choosing mediation in lieu of traditional
justice, is the mark such crimes leave on a unit's sense of community. In
other words, relational crime corrupts unit cohesion.
B. Damaged Unit Cohesion: A Community Effect of Relational
Misconduct
As practitioners and scholars have found, crime disrupts communities.32
This disruption occurs not just in a macro, general welfare sense of crime's
reputational effects on a community or its self-image, but also in that discrete
sense. Relational crimes have fragmentary effects when committed within a
social group of intricately tied members. Relational crime will undermine
that social group's ability to complete common tasks, will diminish the
quality and trust between interpersonal contacts, and will dissolve established
bonds of social or professional dependency. As applied to military culture
and organization, this community-fragmentation effect of relational crime is
manifested by a weakened sense of unit cohesion.
The war-fighting need for muscular unit cohesion has been an observed
truism of military life for millennia.33 Cohesion, manifested by individual
morale and unit-wide esprit, is "grounded in small group ties, [and] is crucial
reinforces the commander-driven military justice scheme. For example, it goes without
saying that reasonable commanders will believe that some emotional and physical
injuries are too grave in severity to side-step traditional criminal investigations and
courts-martial; indeed, some relationship-centric causative factors may be critically
outweighed by other causes, be they chemically-induced, or motivated by greed, revenge,
lust, hatred, or have psychological roots. Nothing, however, about the scope of this
definition, or the ensuing discussion about mediation, forecloses the commander's ability
to make a judgment call about applying, or not applying, mediation in a given
circumstance. Some simple, though plausible, examples of emotional harm in a military
context include the erosion of the victim's self-confidence, disruption of routine, and
anxiety, all of which axiomatically degrade unit cohesion when the victim and offender
are tied together professionally and socially within the same unit. See, e.g., Hallevy,
supra note 24, at 77.
32 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 10, at 109-10 ("crime also disrupts status
relationships among offenders, victims, and communities," and noting that "crime and
punishment are as much about social norms, social influences, and relations between
persons as about individual blame and state-imposed suffering").
33 Frederick J. Manning, Ph.D., Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry, in
TEXTBOOK OF MILITARY MEDICINE, PART I: WARFARE, WEAPONRY, AND THE
CASUALTY-MILITARY PSYCHIATRY: PREPARING IN PEACE FOR WAR 2 (1994), available
at
https://ke.army.mil/bordeninstitute/published-volumes/militarypsychiatry/MPchl.pdf.
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in enabling soldiers to persist in combat under conditions of extreme
privation, fear and uncertainty." 34 Despite wide recognition of this "crucial"
element, often referred to as the "X factor" distinguishing successful
combatants from the defeated,35 its precise definition has never been firmly
agreed upon by the many disciplines studying its nature and consequences.
For example, it may have a significantly different meaning when studied in
the context of small teams or large, multi-layered hierarchies; it may strongly
affect individual behavior or group dynamics when viewed in the context of
a unit undergoing combat conditions yet be weakly associated with
performance in garrison, non-combat environments; it may be influenced by
demographic or social factors in a civilian corporate organization that are
non-existent in a military unit.
Ingraham and Manning, two scholars with a particular interest in the U.S.
Army's institutional emphasis on promoting unit cohesion post-Vietnam War
and post-draft, defined it quite broadly as "feelings of belonging, of solidarity
with a specifiable set of others who constitute 'we' as opposed to 'them."' 36
This definition reduces the concept, however, to a characteristic of group
personality. Arguably, this misses (or at least obscures) the fundamental
reason why military personal are organized and socialized to be members of
disciplined, unified, teams: the accomplishment of a military operation for
which lethal force may be necessary to impart or suffer. Thus, more relevant
definitions of unit cohesion expand its ambit to include not just individuals
and the organization in which they function, but also consider and value a
commitment to shared tasks as one of its intrinsic features. For instance,
some describe unit cohesion as the "bonding together of an organization or
unit's members in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each
other, the group, and the mission." 3 7
Even today, the broad concept of unit cohesion clearly remains a part of
military doctrine and training-although, strangely, without describing it or
34 Lieutenant Colonel Larry H. Ingraham & Major Frederick J. Manning, Cohesion:
Who Needs It, What Is It, and How Do We Get It To Them?, 61 MILITARY REv. 3 (June
1981). See also WILLIAM DARRYL HENDERSON, COHESION: THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN
COMBAT 6 (1985).
35 Manning, supra note 33, at 2, 5.
36 Ingraham and Manning, supra note 34, at 6.
3 Major Geoff Van Epps, Relooking Unit Cohesion: A Sensemaking Approach, 88
MILITARY REv. 102 (Nov.-Dec. 2008). See also Manning, Morale and Cohesion in
Military Psychiatry, at 12.
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defining it in much useful detail.38 Though its definition and scope may be
open to interpretation (depending on the context studied), at least eight
general related properties of the "unit cohesion" concept are apparent. All
are vulnerable to the harmful influence of relational misconduct.
First, at its essence, unit cohesion is an emergent property of groups of
interacting individuals-a property that can be either "thwarted" and
dissolved by external forces or internal strife, or cultivated and promoted by
internal group practices. 39 Thus, when relational crime occurs between
otherwise bonded peers in a small military unit, the bond is snapped-or at
least frayed. A less connected, or less interactive, set of interpersonal
relationships results.
Second, unit cohesion is often viewed as a proxy for discipline.40
Tightly bonded units will, presumably, be more capable and willing to act in
concert and under the direction of their leaders. Relational crime (as defined
above) will necessarily undermine the emotional and psychological factors
influencing the unified obedience to command authority in both victim and
offender.
Third, unit cohesion is-in part-a function of the professionalism,
training, and morale of all members in the group; thus it will suffer from
combinations of low-quality recruits, inadequate training, high attrition or
resignation rates, rampant crime, and a low sense of job satisfaction. 41
38 According to AR 600-20, supra note 22 ("Army Command Policy"), 1-5c.,
"commanders are responsible for developing cohesive units." As a guide, FM 6-22
("Army Leadership"), T 8-23, clarifies that "breaches of trust, poor team coordination,
and outright conflicts" are hallmark indications of a weakly-cohesive or non-cohesive
unit.
39 See, e.g., Ingraham and Manning, supra note 34, at 9-11.
40 Military discipline is "manifested in individuals and units by cohesion, bonding,
and a spirit of teamwork." AR 600-20, supra note 22, 4-lb. More directly,
"[d]iscipline is based on pride in the profession of arms, on meticulous attention to
details, and on mutual respect and confidence." (General George Patton, letter of
instructions to subordinate commanders, 5 June 1943) (quoted in OWEN CONNELLY, ON
WAR AND LEADERSHIP: THE WORDS OF COMBAT COMMANDERS FROM FREDERICK THE
GREAT TO NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF 124 (2002)) (emphasis added).
41 Ingraham & Manning, supra note 34, at 4. See also JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES
IN VIETNAM: COMBAT TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF CHARACTER 198 (1994) (arguing
that individual rotations, in contrast to unit-wide rotations, into and out of Vietnam
directly contributed to the "destruction of unit cohesion" and led to chronic inability to
prevent Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and other psychological harms).
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Fourth, unit cohesion has been viewed as a measure of workplace
climate.42 Relational crime destabilizes service-members' sense of security
among their peers and co-workers. Moreover, the unit's response to that
crime may trigger a victim's negative perceptions of the commander's
support, or may trigger a purported offender's negative perceptions of the
commander's duty to equitably treat his or her subordinates.
Fifth, not surprisingly, unit cohesion has been viewed as an ingredient
for improving individual motivation under stress. 43 Thus, relational crime
may remove a necessary component for inspiring service-members to put
mission and comrades above personal safety."
Sixth, unit cohesion has been found to be intimately related to a service-
member's ability to "communalize combat trauma"-the opportunity for
cathartic sharing of grief with others experiencing similar pain or fear.45
Relational crime, therefore, erases linkages essential for effective coping
with the inherent stress and danger experienced by service-members in both
garrison training environments and combat deployments.
Seventh, unit cohesion has been seen as a measurement for a unit's social
affiliations, affection, organization, and support structure.46 Thus, relational
crime-and ineffectively treated relational crime-signals a dysfunctional
family incapable of preventing or resourcefully resolving internal strife.
Finally, unit cohesion, despite its connotation of group dynamics, has a
poignant personal effect: it is a "primary determinant of an individual
soldier's day-to-day behavior." 47 This observation supports the argument that
the stronger the bonds of mutual affection and desire to accomplish shared
missions in the face of shared sacrifice, the less likely that the ties between
individual members of the cohesive group will internally fracture from
relational misconduct.
These eight properties of unit cohesion-however it may be defined-
clearly establish it within the traditional meaning of a crime's "community"
42 Manning, supra note 33, at 14.
43 HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 22.
44 See, e.g., The Soldier's Creed ("I am a warrior and a member of a team. I serve
the people of the United States, and live the Army Values. I will always place the mission
first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen
comrade...."), available at http://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html.
45 SHAY, supra note 41, at 55.
46 HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 13-14, 20. See also Manning, supra note 33, at 13
("In a high cohesion unit, the commanding officer will hear about problems, gripes,
snafu's from those involved, not outsiders.").
47 HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 14-20.
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effect. As victim-offender mediation has been regularly relied upon to
resolve crimes that implicate this concern, it should follow that repairing unit
cohesion may be a valid reason commanders use to.justify their choice to use
a form of victim-offender mediation as an unconventional technique for
achieving justice within the ranks. But because the military is an organization
of volunteer employees, the methods by which other large organizations rely
on internal dispute resolution processes are worth considering too.
Therefore, the next section examines how mediation has been employed in
both criminal and administrative employment contexts to achieve the same
positive results and avoid destabilizing community effects.
C. "Victim-Offender" and "Administrative" Mediation Systems for
Avoiding and Repairing Harmful Community Effects
For several decades, mediation has seen increasing use in small claims
disputes in civil courts, 48 "neighborhood disputes," and in certain civilian
criminal cases before prosecutors make charging or indictment decisions.49
Civil courts turn to mediation to resolve small claims between parties
because of its ability to promote bargaining (or at least an open dialogue)
between disputants that may already have a pre-existing relationship-which
may be healthier for sustaining long-term relationships (including
commercial relationships) than its adversarial courtroom cousin, the civil
lawsuit.5 0 But mediation also pops up outside of courtrooms. What this
article will refer to as "administrative mediation" is the use of mediation
practices or systems to resolve employment-related grievances (say, between
an employee and management) or conflict (say, between two disputing peer
employees). Administrative mediation is best illustrated by the myriad
institutionalized programs, operated by businesses and government agencies,
for resolving internal grievances and conflicts using cost-effective, non-
litigious, and work climate-enhancing tactics.51 Such tactics, notably, are
48 See Susan E. Raitt, et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts, 9 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 55, 61-62 (1993).
49 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal
Cases: a Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1264 (1994).
50 Raitt, supra note 48, at 61-62.
51 See generally Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of
Mediation in Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135
(1999). See also ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A RESOURCE GUIDE,
http://opm.gov/er/adrguide/ (briefly describing various mediation processes employed by
government organizations, including the U.S. Postal Service, the Federal Aviation
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already available within the Department of Defense and the individual
Armed Services, such as the Navy.5 2
Meanwhile, many state civilian criminal procedure systems offer
bilateral approaches to justice. These approaches are premised on a belief
that giving the community, the victim, and offender decision-making roles
better captures and reflects the interests of the conflicting parties-even if
one of the parties is ostensibly a victim of a crime.53 These systems offer
mediation as an alternative or diversion from prosecution because (in cases
of property crimes, relational-based misconduct, or minor assaults) mediation
gives the victim a far greater ability to hold the offender accountable to the
victim, achieve direct emotional or financial restitution, and quickly resolve
the dispute with minimal governmental interference and burden.54 Similarly,
criminal justice officials establish and manage victim-offender mediation
when the goals of accountability (of the offender to the victim), catharsis (of
the victim) and restitution (as defined by the victim) outweigh the
government's ability to gain, or need to seek, societal retribution or to create
Administration, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Veterans Affairs,
among others, to resolve employee conflicts; and to address issues for which internal
disciplinary penalties might normally be used within, among others, NASA, the
Department of Defense, and the General Accounting Office).
52 See, e.g., The Department of the Navy's "Conflict Management and Mediation
Model," designed to be compliant with the Secretary of the Navy's Alternative Dispute
Resolution policy (SECNAV Instruction 5800.13A) (Dec. 22, 2005),
http://adr.navy.mil/docs/SIGNED580013A.pdf; see also https://donogc.navy.mil/adr/
adrcm3/One%20%/2OPage%2OSummary/pdf (on file with the author). Moreover, the
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), trainers of Equal
Opportunity (EO) subject matter experts assigned to line units throughout the Army,
offers training on various forms of dispute resolution (including mediation). However,
this training is targeted to non-commissioned officers assigned to perform the function of
the command's Equal Opportunity Advisor-to employ the techniques in the execution
of their official duties at resolving complaints or perception of sexual harassment, or
discrimination based on gender, color, race, national origin, or religion. Additionally,
DEOMI offers a 32 hour-long "mediation certification program" for graduates of its EOA
and EEO courses in order "mediate civilian personnel and equal opportunity disputes
within DoD." At best, their use of mediation skills may bleed over to other leaders
through observation and I am not aware of any systemic effort to train leaders on the
generic principles or techniques of mediation as a dispute resolution process, nor has it
been advertised to leaders as an alternative to unconventional problem-solving when the
issue is low-level criminal misconduct.
53 Hallevy, supra note 24, at 80 ("[V]ictim-offender mediation is for the benefit of
the community as much as it is for the benefit of the victim and the offender.").
54 Mark S. Umbreit & William Bradshaw, Victim Experience of Meeting Adult vs.
Juvenile Offenders: A Cross-National Comparison, 61 FED. PROBATION 33, 33 (1997).
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a deterrent.55 Victim-offender mediation is considered an alternative to
traditional prosecutions wherein the goals of accountability to the victim,
restitution, and emotional catharsis of the victim are emphasized in order to
strengthen or repair relationships and to ease both tangible and intangible
harms. 56 Victim-offender mediation is described by its proponents as a "face-
to-face meeting, in the presence of a trained mediator, between the victim of
a crime and the person who committed that crime ... [wherein] the offender
and the victim can talk to each other about what happened, the effects of the
crime on their lives, and their feelings about it . .. [which may result in] a
mutually agreeable plan to repair any damages that occurred as a result of the
crime." 57 This process is said to give both parties an opportunity to "make
the situation as right as possible," while operating "within or alongside the
criminal justice system." 58
This form of criminal problem solving falls within the broader concept of
"restorative justice" in which neither the parties nor the crime can be
detangled from the web of social interactions or community in which they
play out. By deliberately accounting for the desires of the parties and the
social context, victim-offender mediation arguably plays a "therapeutic" role
in the criminal adjudicatory process. 59
Generally, unlike mediation, adversarial systems showcase parties
presenting opposing views of reality, arbitrated and decided by a fact-finder
like a judge or jury based entirely on legal definitions, concepts, and rules.
In stark contrast to adversarial processes like litigation, unilateral
employment grievance resolutions, or criminal trial by court-martial, victim-
offender mediation and administrative mediation are approaches to solving
interpersonal conflict in which a facilitator helps the disputing parties better
understand the source of conflict between them, to identify matters of
55 Hallevy, supra note 24, at 73-81.
56 See Reimund, supra note 13, at 671, 673-74 (2005).
57 VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.voma.org/abtvom.shtml.
See also Bakker, supra note 7, at 1484.
58 Bakker, supra note 7, at 1480.
59 Hallevy, supra note 24, at 78. See also Katherine L. Joseph, Victim-Offender
Mediation: What Social & Political Factors will Affect its Development, 11 OHIO ST. J.
DisP. REs. 207 (1996). David Wexler defines "Therapeutic jurisprudence" as "the study
of the role of the law as therapeutic agent . . [this] 'lens' enables us to ask a series of
questions regarding legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes that likely would have
gone unaddressed under other approaches .. . [and may] aid in criminal law and
procedure." David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 279, 280-81 (1993).
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concern, and work toward a mutually-acceptable resolution.60 That resolution
may look nothing like traditional punishment but might, in effect, satisfy the
needs of the victim and repair a repairable relationship. Cooperation,
bargaining, and discussion based entirely on the disputants' definition of the
conflict frame the mediation; progress is measured against metrics and rules
that may be far afield from formal legal norms and rules.61
A strong sense of collaborative process-shaping underlies these overt
features. Though the road toward a mediation session may be kick-started by
courts or a prosecutor screening case files for those fact-patterns deemed
suited to the process, gates through which the parties then pass are opened
and closed with the participation and approval of the autonomous parties
themselves. 62 The victim of the offense, or aggrieved employee, is offered a
choice-the consequences of which shape subsequent choices by the
prosecutor or employer and subsequent opportunities of the offender. During
the mediation, each party must make informed choices about what
information to disclose and what information to keep hidden, about how to
interact with the other party, and about which areas within the context of the
dispute are negotiable and which areas are not.
Second, notwithstanding the role of collaboration in both the procedure
and substance of mediation, there is a strong taste of "self-determination"
implicit within such systems. 63 A crime victim evolves from a passive
witness called by the state into an "active partner in the process." 64 If, for
instance, the victim were to reject the initial offer made by the prosecutor
(perhaps because she feared the perpetrator, or her sense of retaliation and
retribution demanded that the conflict be resolved in a public, adversarial
courtroom) the system would retreat back toward a traditional, unilateral,
approach and the victim's interests would become absorbed by the state,
permitting the state to prosecute the offender for violation of its laws.
Similarly, if neither the victim nor the offender were satisfied with the
mediation itself (that is, they could not understand each other's relative
interests and work toward a mutually-acceptable solution) then they,
knowingly and voluntarily, shrink the range of options left open to resolve
the conflict. Both of these examples relate only to procedural triggers that
start or end the ADR process. But the parties' self-determination is even
60 See Mark S. Umbreit, supra note 10.
61 Hallevy, supra note 24, at 74.
62 Id. at 82.
63 Hallevy, supra note 24, at 82-84.
6 4 Id. at 76.
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more sharply illustrated during the mediation itself, where the parties actively
decide the scope and content of the conversation, and determine-with
varying degrees of influence by the mediator (or none at all)-the scope and
content of the resolution. The parties, as much as the state, have a say in
shaping the long-term consequences of the dispute or crime.65
But these common features, in what one writer calls a "drama with a
large cast of players," 66 also imply a host of procedural issues. The resolution
of these issues further impacts the rights of the parties relative to each other,
as well as the nature, structure, and enforceability of their mutual agreement.
Deciding, for example, when to mediate, selecting who mediates, identifying
the person who offers the mediation or when to offer it, who mandates the
mediation, where to mediate, the form of the mediated agreement, the goal of
the mediation session, the role of the disputants' lawyers, and the particular
approach or style of the mediator inside the room are just some of the
choices that may affect the outcome in any given case, most notably on the
attributes of fairness, enforceability and durability of the resolution.67
Consequently, the practice of mediation is so varied that even discerning a
common pattern of effective mediation styles is subject to intense academic
and professional disagreement. 68
65 See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS,
Rules 10.2 10 ("Mediation Defined") and 10.3 10 ("Decisions made during a mediation
are to be made by the parties. A mediator shall not make substantive decisions for any
party. A mediator is responsible for assisting the parties in reaching informed and
voluntary decisions while protecting their right of self-determination.").
66 Hallevy, supra note 24, at 78.
67 Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 10-11 (1996). The
role of the mediator inside a session (with respect to the type and amount of information
he or she provides to the parties, the balance he or she strikes between facilitating
conversation and generating ideas for the parties, and whether he or she engages in any
subjective evaluation of their respective positions and interests) is a hotly debated topic in
practice and academic circles. See also Appendices A, B, and C following the body of
this article, in which I attempt to show one application or series of answers to these
questions. See Sander & Rozdeiczer, supra note 25, at 39-40.
68 See generally Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply
to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85 (1981); Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox:
The Highwire Act ofEvaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 62 (1996).
See also Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 71, 72 n.4 (cataloguing more than a dozen pieces
of scholarship debating, to some extent, the fundamental philosophies that do-or
should-guide neutral interveners participating in mediation).
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Defined in this way, and despite the varied practice or style of
mediation, five key features distinguish mediation from traditional state-
sanctioned adversarial conflict resolution:
* A mediator with no interest in the outcome of the dispute, no formal
relationship with the disputing parties, and no authorization to enforce any
settlement agreement;
* Voluntary agreement among the disputing parties to participate in
mediation;
* No expected or coerced settlement among the disputing parties;
* No pre-determined consequence for failing to arrive at a settlement.
* Exercising both self-determination and collaborative problem-
framing, the parties define what a "just" outcome should or will be.69
With these general, but key, features of mediation in mind, this article
will next turn to the question of how such a conflict resolution system would
fit within orthodox military justice. To answer that, we must first appreciate
two essential philosophies and characteristics of military justice. First, the
focus of military justice is necessarily reinforcing discipline and instilling
order within the ranks to make the accomplishment of military missions and
operations successful. Secondly, commanders are responsible for enforcing
and promoting this type of justice because they are ultimately responsible for
accomplishing the military mission-i.e., meeting one objective contributes
to the other. It turns out that neither of these intrinsic philosophies rules out
creative, multilateral dispute-resolution under appropriate circumstances.
Indeed, they both may be interpreted as creating the conditions that would
permit mediation to grow alongside traditional military justice processes.
69 One well-regarded commentator and practitioner of mediation wrote that "there is
no comprehensive or widely-accepted system for ... describing [forms of mediation]."
Riskin, supra note 67, at 8. Though we can glean certain key terrain features associated
with most forms of mediation, Riskin essentially argues that the variety of techniques
employed by mediators and the variety choices that courts, disputants, lawyers, and
mediators face in designing a system (or case-specific procedure) make a universal
description of mediation impossible, or at least potentially "misleading." Id. at 11.
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III. NESTING MEDIATION WITHIN ORTHODOX MILITARY JUSTICE
A. Traditional Military Justice
1. Orthodox Military Criminal Law is Focused on Discipline and
Order
Nine months into a year-long deployment, Sergeant Bixbee,70 a team
leader in the Brigade Headquarters' logistics planning section, hears from a
buddy that he has been recommended (along with most sergeants) for an
Army Commendation Medal as his "end-oftour" award. Though not
surprised, this sergeant becomes suddenly apoplectic when he overhears that
his long-time roommate and fellow team-leader in the logistics section,
Sergeant Conners, was being recommended for a Bronze Star medal, a more
renowned and distinguished award. Though they considered themselves
friends, their relationship has slowly but noticeably soured ever since Bixbee
learned that his girlfriend cheated on him with Conners shortly before they
deployed together, though after Bixbee had ostensibly broken off his
relationship with his girlfriend Furious at the news of the disparate award
decision, Bixbee unleashes his frustration in front of the personnel services
section, screaming a series of profanity-laced insults against Conners,
including allegations that Conners did not deserve that medal because he
routinely "abused" the company's policy on driving non-tactical vehicles for
personal use around their forward operating base. Sergeant Bixbee then
storms away, putting his fist angrily through dry-wall as he departed and
completely ignoring the verbal command of his company First Sergeant, who
had arrived halfvay through the tirade, to "stay right here and don't say
another word."
Using the traditional approaches of military justice, a commander could
address and resolve the dispute described above in a variety of ways. At
least eight distinct offenses are raised by this fact pattem71-each of which
70 All names within this article's hypothetical fact patterns are fictional.
71 Sergeant Bixbee's loud, unruly screaming and punching the wall in front of
another Soldier in the unit's office space could constitute a violation of Art. 108
(wrongful damage to government property), Art. 116 (as a breach of the peace), Art. 128
(assault, by offer), and Art. 134 (disorderly conduct; or self-injury without intent to avoid
service). UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 908-934 (2012). Knowledge, but non-disclosure, that his
fellow non-commissioned officer was breaking a unit policy or general order regarding
personal use of non-tactical vehicles in a hostile fire zone implicates Art. 77 and Art. 121
(wrongful appropriation of government property under an"aiding and abetting theory) or
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(isolated or together) shoulder differing degrees of stigma, trigger a range of
professional consequences, impose myriad costs and burdens on the
command, and inflict an array of potential punishments or otherwise adverse
administrative penalties. Obviously, orthodox tools like formal and informal
counseling, non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ,72
reprimands, and transfers are all available options for a commander to
consider in resolving this conflict between two brigade staff members. 73
Given their ranks, however, and given that the staff is deployed to a combat
zone, choosing among these various options is a complicated endeavor.
For example, the gravity of the offense must surely be weighed against
the effect such traditional approaches might have on esprit de corps and unit
cohesion-axiomatically important factors for a deployed unit. Moreover,
the forecasted effect of the traditional approaches must be balanced against
their inherent uncertainty in resolving the underlying friction: the less certain
the commander is about the nature of the relational misconduct's cause, the
less certain the commander should be about the consequences of the chosen
punishment. Finally, the commander's inclination to pursue some degree of
an investigation into Sergeant Bixbee's anger-fueled allegations, or proceed
with a traditional punitive action against him must be tempered by the
logistical, operational, and emotional features of a unit deployed to a theater
of war. These considerations are the raison d'dtre for military law and its
separate penal code:
The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining
good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the
national security of the United States. 74
Even the Supreme Court has "long recognized" that a unique balance
between justice and military effectiveness necessarily drives the evolution of
possibly Art. 134 (misprison of serious offense). Id. at §§ 877-934. Ignoring the First
Sergeant's order to remain in place after hitting the wall raises the specter of Art. 91
(insubordinate conduct toward a non-commissioned officer). Id. at § 891.
72 "[A]ny commanding officer may, in addition to or in lieu of admonition or
reprimand, impose one or more of the following disciplinary punishments for minor
offenses without the intervention of a court-martial" [thereafter listing special constraints
and circumstances].UCMJ, art. 15 (2012), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2012). See also MCM,
Part V.
73 See R.C.M. 306(c) and MCM, Part V.
74 MCM, Preamble, 1 3.
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customary military tradition and criminal sanctions.75 The UCMJ is replete
with prohibitions on "aspects of the conduct of members of the military
which [in] the civilian sphere are left unregulated" because, in part, they
directly implicate the general discipline of, or tend to repudiate the public
estimation of, the "tightly knit military community." 76
Nevertheless, even with such a fundamentally distinguishable purpose
framing the military justice system's structure and substance, no criminal
justice system functions in a vacuum. Human judgment and discretion
naturally animate these prosecutorial decisions based on a desire for
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, restitution, rehabilitation, or a blend of
these goals. However, this truism remains intact even when the
commander's ultimate end is not one of these traditional criminal justice
goals, but rather the restoration or strengthening of unit cohesion through
some form of victim-offender mediation.
2. Military Justice is Command-Directed, Thus Permitting
Potential Bridges to Non-Traditional Approaches
Any traditional military justice approach the commander might employ
would be imposed unilaterally and from the top down: that is, the
commander-rather than the disputing parties as in a mediation-makes a
decision and takes action based on an informed, but ultimately divorced,
impression of what he or she believes to be fair and appropriate. In many
cases, commanders (rather than law enforcement agencies) decide whether a
criminal or quasi-criminal investigation should ensue and what form it
should take.77 Commanders decide, when the evidence is available, how to
proceed-to prosecute or not; and if yes, to what level?78 With non-judicial
punishment, commanders ultimately decide the scale of (limited) punishment
75 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
76 Id. at 749. See MCM, Part IV, $ 60.c.(2) and (3). See also UCMJ, arts. 83-97, 89,
90, 91, 92, 94, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 112, 113, 115, 133, and 134, 10
U.S.C. §§ 883-934. Some prototypically civilian offenses criminalized by the UCMJ,
such as Art. 128, are further aggravated with supplemental elements enhancing the
maximum available punishment under conditions that erode or degrade traditional
concepts of military discipline and order.
77 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS (2 Oct. 2006) [hereinafter AR 15-6]; R.C.M. pt. 303.
78 R.C.M. pt. 306.
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upon a finding of guilt.79 A senior commander empowered to convene a
court-martial ultimately has the authority to approve or reduce the findings or
sentence meted out by the judge or panel.80
Striking as this may appear to the civilian criminal bar, this responsibility
is the lawful and traditional judicial authority vested in commanders.
Military officers, as the eminent Samuel Huntington once paraphrased, are
professional managers of violence. 81 But when also challenged with the
responsibility of command, they face an inventory of daunting managerial
tasks, all of which are directly or indirectly associated with unit cohesion. 82
While their "primary function [is] accomplishing the unit's assigned mission
[they must necessarily do so] while caring for personnel and property in their
charge" 83: in a general sense: they are "responsible for everything their
command does or fails to do." 84 Commanders must encourage and sustain
the professional development of the Soldiers under their command;85
leverage the "full range of human potential" in their organization; 86 instruct
their charges on military discipline and military law; 87 ensure their soldiers
are properly trained, and that their equipment and government property is in
a "proper state of readiness at all times."8 8 Existentially, commanders must
also demonstrate "virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;" 89 to examine
the conduct of subordinates and "guard against and suppress all dissolute and
immoral practices;" 90 to "take all necessary and proper measures, under the
laws, regulations, and customs of the Army" in "promot[ing] and
79 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, I 3-1-3-45 (3 Oct. 2011)
[hereinafter AR 27-10]; MCM, Part V.
80 UCMJ Art. 60(c)(1) and (3)(A)B), 10 U.S.C. § 860; R.C.M. pt. 1107(b).
81 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 11 (1957).
82 Commanders are entrusted with "establishing [the] leadership climate ... and
developing disciplined and cohesive units." U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY
COMMAND POLICY, 1-5c (18 Mar. 2008). Though this regulation is Army-specific, its
tenets related to command responsibility may reasonably be considered universally
applicable across all armed services.
83 d. at 2-la.
84 Id. at 2-l b.
85 Id
86 Id. at 11-5c(4)(a).
87 Id. at 1 -5c(4)(b), and 4-1c.
88 AR 600-20, 1-5c(4)(c).
89 Id. at 11-5d(l).
90 Id. at 1-5d(2) and (3).
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safeguard[ing] the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare
of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge." 91
This catalog of regulatory, customary, and traditional 92 duties comes
with it a special and-when compared to leaders in the business or civil
government-unique obligation to exercise the means, methods, and goals of
justice within the ranks. By giving commanders the ability to launch
investigations into misconduct, pursue administrative corrective measures,
initiate non-judicial punishment, charge service-members with crimes under
the UCMJ, or take no action whatsoever, the military has afforded its
executives-junior, mid-level, and senior managers-powers akin to police
chiefs, district attorneys, and judges.93 But the difficulty then becomes one
of commanders properly and justly exercising such wide-ranging, and
judgment-rife judicial powers-a duty that the drafters of the Manual for
Courts-Martial acknowledge to be "one of the most important and difficult
decisions facing a commander." 94
The Manual for Courts-Martial is the primary exposition, in military law,
of a commander's prosecutorial discretion. It lists factors that a judicious,
fair commander should consider before taking any action in response to a
given crime or misconduct. 95 The ability to navigate these factors and
exercise the independent maturity required of these judicial functions is
steered only by the commander's natural prudence, experience, and advice
from trusted subordinates, peers, or senior officers. Each of the Armed
Services publishes veritable libraries of detailed regulations, field manuals,
technical manuals, forms, pamphlets, circulars, and training guides to provide
commanders with clear standards and rules for accomplishing various tasks.
In individual cases, the commander must consider these subjective factors
with no clear guidance on how to value or weight these factors in making
that ultimate disposition choice.96
91 Id. at 1-5d(4) and (5).
92 HUNTINGTON, SOLDIER AND THE STATE, supra note 82 at 15.
93 See generally Major Donald W. Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander?,
41 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1968), available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/jagcnetinternet/
homepages/ac/tjagsaweb.nsf/Main?OpenFrameset.
94 R.C.M. 306(b), Discussion.
95 Id.
96 Id. These factors include: the nature of the misconduct, availability of witnesses
and other evidence, the impact on the purported victim, the effect of the ill-discipline on
the unit's mission or readiness, military "exigencies," recommendations by the chain-of-
command, motives of the accuser, the appropriateness of the anticipated or likely
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B. Current Institutionalized Processes Allow for Innovation
1. Manual for Courts-Martial
Beyond the UCMJ penal statute and the judicial decisions from the
disparate service trial and appellate courts and the federal Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces,97 military criminal law is a broad domain. It
encompasses service-specific regulations that implement the UCMJ; the
orders of the president as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; and the
natural, inherent authority of commanders to enforce good order and
discipline.98 The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) is a compendium of
these sources of law and includes the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) and
the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE) promulgated under the president's
procedure and rule-making authority under Article 36 of the UCMJ.99 The
MCM's most overt purpose is to provide a single-source body of law and
procedures for practitioners and the public to consult.100 The MCM is
particularly noteworthy for the broad discretion it affords commanders and
the flexible approaches to managing misconduct it endorses.
First, the RCM contains sweeping prescriptive procedural rules and
presidential guidance for applying and interpreting those rules when
adjudicating criminal offenses. 101 Of course, the catalyst for any criminal
adjudication is ultimately the commander's choice to pursue one of several
courses of action given that situation's factual circumstances. This discretion
punishment, the professional history of the suspect, and the effect of the potential
punishment on the soldier's career. See also MCM, Part V.1 .d. (1)-(2).
97 The Army, Coast Guard, and Air Force each have a discrete criminal appellate
court (the Navy and Marine Corps share an appellate court) empowered to review the
decisions, findings, and sentences from the trial courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. §866 Art. 66.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is empowered to review decisions from the
respective service Courts of Criminal Appeals, which is then subject to review by the
U.S. Supreme Court. 10 U.S.C. §867 Art. 67 and §867a Art. 67a.
98 U.S. CONST. art. 1II, §2, cl. 1; MCM, Preamble, at I-1; WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 27-28 (2d. ed. reprint 1920).
99 10 U.S.C. §836 Art. 36.
100 MCM, Appendix 21, at A21-1.
101 Inter alia, the R.C.M. includes rules on jurisdictional matters (R.C.M. 201-204),
apprehension and pre-trial restraint (R.C.M. 302, 304, 305), pre-trial investigations
(R.C.M. 405), actions by the court-martial convening authority (R.C.M. 403, 404, 407,
and 601), composition of military juries and the qualifications for judges and counsel
(R.C.M. 501, 502), discovery and witness production (R.C.M. 701-703), specific trial
procedures (R.C.M. 810-813, 901-924, 1001-1011, and 1101-1114), and the appellate
process (R.C.M. 1201-1210).
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is best embodied in RCM 306, entitled "Initial Disposition," modeled in part
on the American Bar Association's standard for prosecutorial discretion.102
In the RCM 306's non-binding but persuasive "discussion" section, in which
the drafters distill treatise-like guidance to the field,103 commanders and their
legal advisors are alerted to the myriad considerations that ought to bear on
the disposition choice. Rather than look to the nature of the offense alone, or
the strength of the evidence, or the desire for retribution against the offender,
the Rule permits a broader view that stretches across the full context of the
incident. To achieve the end-state of a "warranted, appropriate, and fair"
prosecutorial decision, the Rule tasks commanders to carefully balance
salient features that shape the encapsulating military community: military
exigencies like short-notice deployments or training, the suspected offender's
character and military service, as well as "the extent of the
harm . .. including the offense's effect on [the] morale, health, safety,
welfare, and discipline" of the military organization or unit to which the
suspect is assigned.104
Once these factors are weighed, the commander is still left with various
options for addressing the misconduct or offense in a way that is "warranted,
appropriate, and fair" 105-take no action at all,106 charge and pursue a court-
martial,107 or pursue non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the
UCMJ108 (an abbreviated process in which the suspect trades away some due
process rights for a cap on potential punishments and expediency, but which
can be rejected by a suspect in favor of a court-martial on the merits.) 0 9
This flexibility is further amplified by giving the commander free reign to
design an administrative solution that best fits within the case-specific
circumstances and salient features of the military community in which the
offense occurs.1 0 The list of such administrative ("corrective") solutions is
long and non-exhaustive:
102 ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION 3-3.9(b) (1979) (ABA 3d ed.
1993). See MCM, Appendix 21, at A21-2 1.
103 MCM, Appendix 21, at A21-3.
104 R.C.M. 306(b), Discussion.
105 R.C.M. 306(b)(1), Discussion.
106 R.C.M. 306(c)(1).
107 R.C.M. 306(c)(4), 401.
108 R.C.M. 306(c)(3).
I0 9 See generally MCM, Part V.
I10 R.C.M. 306(c)(2).
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[C]ounseling, admonition, reprimand, exhortation, disapproval, criticism,
censure, reproach, rebuke, extra military instruction, or the administrative
withholding of privileges, or any combination of the above.111
Though these possible choices are less severe than criminal sanctions,
they still reflect the prosecutor-like discretion of the commander, and imply
such discretion is open to creative problem-solving. Less-formal, less-
directive, multi-lateral options are not foreclosed. Part V of the MCM
expounds on this flexible discretion to design corrective solutions, describing
them as part and parcel of "effective leadership" used to maintain good order
and discipline.112 Moreover, while these corrective solutions are considered
more of a consequence than punishment, the drafters specifically envisioned
that commanders might-relying on the principles of RCM 306-adopt
creative solutions for redressing misconduct:
Administrative corrective measures are not punishment, and they may
be used for acts or omissions which are not offenses under the [UCMJ] and
for acts or omissions which are offenses under the [UCMJ] (emphasis
added).' 13
These provisions endorse commander discretion and the kind of creative,
case-by-case adjudication that contemplates the military community and
environment in which the offense arose. In the absence of any direct or tacit
caveat, or outright disapproval, for mediation, these provisions lend clear
support for unorthodox approaches, mediation included, that circumvent
traditional disciplinary actions like courts-martial or non-judicial punishment
when the facts call for them. Since military criminal law appears to offer no
prohibition or barrier, and indeed suggests it may be tolerant of victim-
offender mediation under RCM 306's principles, the next question is whether
commanders might find further support in operational decision-making
doctrine. As discussed infra, such support may be found in (or at least
adapted from) two complementary sources.
Ill Id.
112 MCM, Part V.1.d(l).
113 Id. at Part V. .g (emphasis added).
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2. Design and Composite Risk Management: Dealing with
Uncertainty, Risk, and Complexity
The Army has doctrinally adopted several reasoning methodologies for
coping with uncertainty and multi-dimensional tactical problems in a way
analogous to the MCM's permissive support for non-judicial punishment and
flexible administrative corrective measures. 114 As with many complicated
problems with uncertain outcomes fraught with risk for potential unintended
consequences, military officers rely on historically-proven and well-
rehearsed methodologies that simplify these problems. One such heuristic
familiar to commanders is the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP).11 5 By breaking problems down to manageable tasks, clearly
defining objectives, establishing and relying on quantifiable metrics for
grading various possible courses-of-action, leaders are funneled toward a
rational, reasonable decision in face of hazy or chaotic operating
environments. Design, in contrast to the traditional MDMP mentioned
earlier,' 16 explicitly recognizes the friction, unpredictability, and human
limitations intrinsic to conflict." 7 Consequently, proponents of this
methodology actively encourage the "critical and creative" visualization,
114 This article focuses on the Army, rather than inclusive of the other Armed
Services, for two reasons. First, the author's professional experience in the Army affords
a far clearer perspective for assessing opportunities for mediation. Second, the Army is
the largest consumer and producer of military justice: population-wise, it is the largest of
the Services and annually prosecutes more courts-martial for misconduct than the other
Services. In the Fiscal Year 2011, the Army reported that it tried 1,081 cases to
conviction or acquittal (combining both "General" and "Special" courts-martial
statistics), whereas the Air Force accounted for 664 trials, the Coast Guard accounted for
38, and the Navy and Marine Corps combined for 898 courts-martial. Annual Report
Submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the United States Senate and the
United States House of Representatives and to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, andAir Force Pursuant to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice for the Period October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2011,
app. at §§ 3, 4, 5, and 6 (reports of the individual Service Judge Advocate Corps and
service-specific "Military Justice Statistics").
115 Major Blair S. Williams, Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making,
MIL. REV. 40, 40-52 (Sept.-Oct. 2010).
116 Brigadier General (P) Edward C. Cardon & Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard,
Unleashing Design: Planning and the Art of Battle Command, MIL. REv. 2, 3 (Mar.-Apr.
2010) [hereinafter, Unleashing Design].
117 U.S. DEP'T OF ARmy, FIELD MANUAL 5-0, THE OPERATIONS PROCESS, 3-20 and
3-24 (26 Mar. 2010).
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description, and formulation of novel approaches to complex, "ill-structured"
problems.11 8 This largely formless approach, distinguished from a systemic
analytical process, relies on "multiple perspectives" and "varied sources of
situational knowledge"ll 9 to generate a model of problem framing.120 If the
problem is framed accurately-that is, the "symptoms, the underlying
tensions, and the root causes" of the conflict or issue are understood and
valued properly-then commanders and their staffs are in the best possible
position to distinguish the truly critical components of their mission from the
ancillary or incidental features. To paraphrase its advocates, this nascent
Army doctrine allows commanders to not just solve the problem right, but to
solve the right problem.121
Though largely unstructured, Design demands a free-flowing, "iterative
collaboration and dialog" among echelons of command, subject matter
experts, and hand-picked staff to complement the delivery of command
guidance and the orders process.1 22 It is presented as cyclic and continuous-
an organizational learning exercise in which the motives, tendencies,
limitations, and context of possible environmental circumstances, unintended
consequences, and actors are examined, re-examined, and "synthesized." 23
Design is, for lack of a better phrase, designed to foster the brain-storming
development of a reasonable set of desired conditions, and identify creative
and potentially unconventional solutions that engineer those conditions.
Similarly, Composite Risk Management (CRM) is self-styled as the
"Army's primary decision-making process to identifying hazards and
controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army missions, functions,
operations, and activities."' 24 CRM intends to be a chaos-mitigation tool
fully integrated within the broader process of generic MDMP.125 The Army
defines "hazard" rather expansively, as those acts or threats that not only
damage people or equipment, but as anything that otherwise has an impact
118 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, supra note 117, at13-1.
'l 9 Id. at 3-3.
120 Id. at 3-8.
121 Unleashing Design, supra note 116 at 6; FM 5-0, T 3-26.
122 FM 5-0, 3-30, 3-32.
123 FM 5-0, 1 3-36, 3-37, 3-38, and 3-49.
124 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 5-19, COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT, 1-1
(21 Aug. 2006) [hereinafter FM 5-19]. See also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 385-10, THE
ARMY SAFETY PROGRAM, I 1-5c (7) (23 Aug. 2007) [hereinafter AR 385-10] (mandating
that all "Army leaders at all levels" will "integrate CRM into their mission activities").
125 FM 5-19, 14-5.
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(presumably detrimental) on "mission effectiveness" whether it is on- or off-
duty.126  Notably, such a broad definition expressly envisions CRM's
adoption by military justice practitioners:
The principles of CRM become indispensable in addressing issues that
impact Soldiers both on and off the battlefield. Effective CRM is on-going
and cyclic. The risk management process is integrated into the development
of all SOPs and the development process for all policies that address issues
of behavior, health, and criminal activity. (emphasis added) 12 7
The decision-making approach that CRM attempts to inculcate is a five-
step, deeply proactive, model that has leaders continuously "identifying" and
"assessing" hazards, and subsequently "developing" and "implementing"
control measures. 128 Moreover, CRM envisions leaders addressing the
"behavior traits of individual Soldiers" as a key component of the hazard-
identification process.129 By encouraging leaders to acutely probe all possible
risks, their impacts, and comparing potential loss against potential gain,130
leaders should develop a continuous feedback loop of information on which
to base and then refine decisions affecting how a particular mission is framed
and the means by which it is to be executed.
Such a standardized system has unequivocal generic resonance. In fact,
Army doctrine explicitly considers CRM as a valuable aid in preventing one
particular type of relationship-based crime: sexual assaults.131 Moreover,
doctrine openly acknowledges the wide potential field of applications for
CRM's five-step model outside traditional military training and war-
fighting.132
In sum, both Design and CRM address distinct but related types of duties
inherent to command responsibility: risk reduction and mission-
accomplishment. Because both methodologies acknowledge that such
endeavors are fraught with unforeseeable or unintended consequences, their
doctrines demand continuous reflection and adaptation to situational
constraints and human-driven variables. They incorporate principles of
126 Id at 1-2.
127 Id at 6-1.
128 Id. at 1-1,1 1-27, T 1-36.
129 Id at 1-9,1 1-15.
130 FM 5-19, 4-5.
131 Id at 6-2.
132 Id at 6-5, 6-6.
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flexibility and creativity, and require collaborative, proactive leaders in order
to fully implement their approaches. Both Design and CRM seem ripe,
therefore, as useful doctrinal foundations on which to explore alternative or
unorthodox military justice applications. Therefore, the next question is
whether mediation can be viewed similarly: as a forum for considering
situational constraints and opportunities for collaborative engagement, and
the extent to which it permits flexibility, creativity, and innovative problem-
framing.
C. Mediation for "Relational Misconduct": Re-framing RCM306
for a Mediation Decision
In deciding whether to offer third-party mediation in the wake of
relational misconduct (or to avert it), commanders should reflect on the
properties of unit cohesion, gauging the extent to which an incident of
relational crime disrupts it. Doing so necessarily implies a judgment call in
the same way that orthodox discipline is decided and executed under the
policy guidance of RCM 306.133 But in order to balance the interests of the
service-member against the default inclination toward traditional methods of
ensuring discipline, the commander should consider multiple factors and
circumstances in the same way he or she would under RCM 306. So, for
instance, a commander may consider:
* the nature of the conduct, including its effect on "morale, health,
safety, welfare, and discipline" 34
* the likelihood that the relational misconduct will continue or escalate
in the absence of command intervention
* the relationship (professional and personal) between the disputing
service-members: does the fracture of the relationship implicate unit
cohesion concerns?
* the prevalence of this misconduct across the unit and any
corresponding need for a general deterrent
133 Here, one looks to a combination of sources in the MCM that discuss the
expansive jurisdiction of the commander and his or her authority to trigger both an
investigation of crime and the disposition of offenses once investigated. For a thoughtful
critique of those powers, see Guy P. Glazier, He Called for his Pipe, and he Called for
his Bowl, and he Called for his Members Three-Selection of Military Juries by the
Sovereign: Impediment to Military Justice, 157 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1998).
134 See R.C.M. 306, discussion.
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* each disputing service-member's professional record and the impact
that judicial or nonjudicial punishment would have on that record
* an assessment of each disputing Soldier's ability and willingness to
participate in mediation in good faithl 35
* whether a traditional "administrative corrective measure" is a more
appropriate remedy given the considerations listed abovel 36
* whether unit cohesion and team-building might be improved in this
case by encouraging a problem-solving approach by the disputants
themselves, rather than imposing a resolution from the command
* recommendations from the Soldiers' chain-of-command and
supervisors
* the unit's operational tempo and whether a referral to mediation
would significantly interfere with military operations, essential training, or
deployment
Note that many of these factors mirror the extenuating, mitigating, or
aggravating factors described in the MCM,137 but several-for example, the
personal relationship between the disputing Soldiers and effect on unit
cohesion-are related, instead, to the type of dispute most commonly
associated with, and benefiting from, a mediated settlement. If a more
detailed standard, beyond a menu of factors, should need to be articulated,
the existing language of the MCM could be tailored to read:
Mediation may be appropriate when preferral of charges or imposition of
nonjudicial punishment would not meet the needs of justice, discipline, or
unit cohesion. Furthermore, mediation may be appropriate when traditional
administrative corrective measures are inadequate or over-punitive given the
135 "Good faith" is not easily defined, or is perhaps more easily defined by its
opposite: as in, mandated or coerced participation in mediation, or "half-hearted" efforts
to settle, or "gaming" the process by only disclosing information that the disputant knows
would shape the outcome in a way most favorable to their position and most unfavorable
to their "opponent," or participation in the process only to obtain discrediting information
about the other party are all examples of potential "bad faith" participation. See
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a Requirement of Good
Faith in Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997 at 9, 9-13 (1997) (identifying some
impediments to precise definition of "good faith" in a mediation and proposing an
inclusive list of illustrations of "good faith," as well as proposing consequences for
failing to satisfy that standard).
136 See MCM, Part V.1.g.
137 See R.C.M. 306(b), discussion.
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nature of the Soldiers' conduct, the disputing Soldiers' professional and
personal relationship, an assessment of the Soldiers' willingness and ability
to participate in mediation in good faith, the impact of traditional measures
on the Soldiers' record, and need to promote team-building and strengthen
unit cohesion.
By mirroring the language of the MCM and Article 15 guidance, this
mediation-referral standard is more familiar linguistic territory for both
commanders and their advising Judge Advocates. It places mediation on the
same spectrum of disposition choices as "punishment" and "administrative
corrective measures," but it reinforces the commander's discretion to decide
where and when that point is most appropriately located.
IV. A PROSPECTIVE FRAMEWORK AND PLAUSIBLE CONCERNS
Operational doctrine and military jurisprudence both seem to suggest
opportunities for exploring unorthodox problem-solving, like mediation, in
the context of a relational misconduct. At the very least, mediation is not
directly prohibited by the UCMJ, the Manual for Courts-Martial, or
regulations. However, indirect prohibitions-or at least indirect but off-
putting consequences of mediation-might suggest such a system is
pragmatically or legally suspect. First, in Part IV.A., this section proposes a
model or framework mediation system against which we can weigh potential
criticisms; secondly, in Part IV.B., this article identifies those chief concerns
with mediation, most of which have been robustly discussed in civilian
academic analyses. But, given the nature of the military and its traditional
criminal justice procedures, additional anxieties-primarily related to
efficiency and encroachment on command-discretion-are also raised.
Thoughtful consideration of these concerns, after reviewing a possible
mediation framework, though, suggests these concerns may be unwarranted
or overreactions to a system that has, up to this point, been absent (and
therefore unexamined) from the practical reality of military justice.
A. Prospective Framework: A "Commander's Alternative Mediation
Program"
Captain (CPT) Mike Jackson is the Deputy Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
an eight-Soldier staff section in a Brigade Headquarters. Master Sergeant
(MSG) Marissa Williams is the section Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge
(NCOIC). The Brigade headquarters has been deployed to Iraq for five
weeks, but these two Soldiers have worked together for nearly a full year.
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Over the last four or five months, but especially over the course of
deployment so far, tensions have periodically risen between CPT Jackson
and MSG Williams based on continued disagreements over their roles and
influence with their staff section OIC, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jones, as
well as their respective division of labor and workloads. On three occasions
in the last two weeks, the tension broke the surface, erupting in the form of
heated exchanges during the middle of the duty day. Last night, however,
this clash of wills finally became all-out warfare when a lengthy and loud
argument began in which MSG Williams screamed a series of profanity-
laced jabs at CPT Jackson's professional competence after storming into his
office. Three Soldiers, in the ranks of Private First Class, Specialist, and
Sergeant, were in the large section conference room that doubled as CPT
Jackson's office at the time and witnessed the eruption. CPT Jackson chose
not to respond to MSG Williams directly, opting instead to confront his boss,
the section OIC. LTC Jones, walking into his own office having just barely
survived a two hour-long Battle Update Brief tersely rejected CPT Jackson's
request to formally counsel the NCOIC for disrespect of an officer, a crime
under the UCMJ, without explanation. This morning, however, CPT
Williams (still seething from the insult) spoke with COL Adams, the Brigade
Commander, adamantly expressing his anger at the continued "verbal
abuse " at the hands of MSG Williams but cautiously expressing his
frustration at the seeming lack of concern by their mutual supervisor, LTC
Jones. After dismissing a visibly upset CPT Jackson, COL Adams asked
Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Janet Roberts and the Brigade Judge
Advocate, Major (MAJ) Joe Martinez, for their advice. COL Adams brought
up several issues, to include their ranks, their long history of professional
disagreement, the extent to which LTC Jones fit into the problem, and
whether the misconduct witnessed by the section's Soldiers warrants serious
consideration of adverse action, under the UCM.
1. Scope
For the purposes of this article, let us call a proposed mediation
process-one which purposefully acknowledges and is built around a
command-centric justice system-as the "Commander's Alternative
Mediation Program" (CAMP). As described here, it has two broad
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components: first, creating a discretionary, pre-disciplinel 38 program that
permits a commander to offer, and disputing Soldiers to voluntarily accept, a
referral to neutral mediation from outside the unit; second, by creating a
second mediation resource in some ways parallel to Equal Opportunity (EO)
complaint systems, Soldiers may voluntarily participate in the program
without command-interference if they believe it may be an advantageous
method of solving their relational conflicts. Though this article details the
design of this two-pronged system, it is offered only as one possible design
to demonstrate some of the overarching themes, requirements and individuals
involved in such a system. At bottom, because CAMP would operate as an
internal dispute resolution tool among volunteer employees against the
backdrop of criminal offenses under the UCMJ, it attempts to adopt and
blend the procedures and guiding philosophies of both victim-offender and
administrative mediation described in Part II.C.
The objective of CAMP is two-fold. First, to provide service-members
an opportunity or forum for taking ownership over their dispute in an effort
to resolve it. Its second objective is to help the command diffuse a
potentially serious conflict before it escalates, demanding (or suggesting) a
need for administrative or punitive responses. The process is not intended to
guarantee a settlement or agreement each time, though a settlement or
agreement is a potential outcome that the disputing service-members may
work toward. Because the decision to offer mediation is at the commander's
discretion, and the result of the mediation (e.g., a signed agreement by the
disputants) does not foreclose other administrative or punitive action by the
command, CAMP does not abridge any existing UCMJ authority granted to a
commander, and expands the range of resources available in resolving
service-member interpersonal conflicts that detract from mission
accomplishment and degrade unit cohesion.
Therefore, the CAMP is designed to do two things. First, it provides the
unit with an alternative to traditional "administrative corrective measures"
and nonjudicial punishment under Article 15. This aspect presumes that
some interpersonal, relational, conflicts between Soldiers-while technically
punishable under the UCMJl 39-are more effectively resolved using non-
138 Practically, this means any conflict, dispute, or misconduct between Soldiers for
which an Article 15 or administrative corrective measure (letters of reprimand,
admonishment, counseling, etc.) may be considered by the command team.139 Not all conduct identified as ripe for mediation has devolved into criminal
conduct per se. However, the offenses that materialize from such disputes are
characterized by two features: (1) they do not merit punitive discipline or other
"administrative corrective measures" under the circumstances and (2) they are not
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punitive means in order to strengthen team-building, foster unit cohesion,
avoid the stigma of traditional punitive dispositions like criminal convictions,
and promote problem-solving at the lowest possible level before the dispute
escalates.1 40 Second, it provides a service to Soldiers in the same way that a
military installation's Legal Assistance office provides general legal advice,
services, and support-i.e., when service-members self-identify an
interpersonal dispute they believe might be aided by third-party neutral
facilitator, this program would provide mediation as an avenue by which they
address their conflict in hopes of resolving it without interference or
imposition of a solution by the command.
2. Elements
This section will describe some of the fundamental components of
mediation as a military justice alternative. First, this section presents a broad
outline of the two "tracks" that the CAMP could follow, and discusses the
factors commanders might reasonably consider when contemplating
mediation as a conflict resolution alternative. Additionally, this section also
discusses how jurisdictional issues can be resolved, the role of the
commander as a veto or ratifying authority, and how confidentiality in
mediation may affect military justice decision-making.
i. Tracks
effectively resolved using "top-down," unilateral means to solve the issue. For example,
offenses under Article 117 (provoking speech or gesture), 128 (assault), 134 (disorderly
conduct), 134 (indecent language), or 134 (communicating a threat) are based on facts
that may suggest a resolution through mediation is attainable before the behavior
escalates into conduct that should be punished in the commander's opinion. 10 U.S.C.
§§ 917-934.
140 In this light, I will draw an analogy: mediation is to Article 15 as Article 15 is to
preferral of charges and courts-martial. Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 is
"ordinarily appropriate when administrative corrective measures are inadequate due to
the nature of the minor offense or the record of the servicemember. . . [and] shall be
considered on an individual basis." MCM, Part V.1.d(l). Furthermore, nonjudicial
punishment:
may be imposed for acts or omissions that are minor offenses under the punitive
articles ... ["minor"] depends on several factors: the nature of the offense and the
circumstances surrounding its commission; the offender's age, rank, duty
assignment, record and experience; and the maximum sentence imposable for the
offense if tried by a court-martial . .. [and deciding] whether and offense is "minor"
is a matter of discretion for the commander imposing nonjudicial punishment.
MCM, Part V.1 .e.
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Under the CAMP, interpersonal disputes and conflict among service-
members can be identified in one of two "tracks." Track 1 consists of
command-identified "relational" misconduct: for example, disputes that the
chain-of-command observes among particular service-members and would
otherwise handle in more traditional ways, such as an Article 15 nonjudicial
punishment offer or preferral of charges for court-martial. As discussed
earlier, such misconduct might include minor assaults between roommates in
the barracks,141 insubordinate contempt or disrespectful language toward an
NCO,142 dishonorably failing to honor a personal debt,143 and
communicating a threatl 44 are examples of such relational misconduct.
Track 2 consists of self-identified disputes: disputes and conflicts identified
to the chain-of-command by the particular service-member(s) involved.
Under the CAMP construct, once a dispute is identified, the commanders
who are authorized to impose nonjudicial punishment over the disputants
have the discretion to offer the Soldiers a referral to a neutral mediator.
ii. Initial Disposition Factors
As explained above in Part III.C., the choice to direct a particular episode
of misconduct, which may raise concerns about degradation to unit cohesion,
must be guided by the judgment of the commander in light of many
circumstances. Mirroring (and expanding) the prosecutorial discretion
factors listed in RCM 306, a commander should therefore consider the nature
of the conduct, including its effect on "morale, health, safety, welfare, and
discipline, the likelihood that the relational misconduct will continue or
escalate in the absence of command intervention, the relationship
(professional and personal) between the disputing service-members, the
prevalence of this misconduct across the unit and any corresponding need for
a general deterrent, each disputing service-member's professional record and
the impact that judicial or nonjudicial punishment would have on that record,
an assessment of each disputing Soldier's ability and willingness to
participate in mediation in good faith, whether a traditional "administrative
corrective measure" is a more appropriate remedy, its foreseeable effect on
141 10 U.S.C. § 928 art. 128. In particular, "simple assaults" and "assaults
consummated by a battery" without punishment enhancers or aggravators. See MCM,
Part IV, 54b(1) and (2).
142 10 U.S.C. § 891 Art. 91. See also MCM, Part IV, I 15a(3).
143 10 U.S.C. § 934 Art. 134. See also MCM, Part IV, 71.
144 10 U.S.C. § 934 Art. 134. See also MCM, Part IV, 110.
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unit cohesion and team-building, recommendations from the subordinate
chain-of-command and supervisors, and finally, the unit's operational and
training tempo.
iii. Crossing Command Jurisdictions
The types of situations likely to benefit from mediation-relational
conflicts that may be aggravated by close living and working
environments-are those that potentially cause procedural complications
under Track 1 of the CAMP. If the disputing Soldiers fall under different
UCMJ authorities, questions of proper jurisdiction arise.145 For example,
when the Soldiers are assigned to different companies in the same battalion
or Summary Court-Martial Convening Authority, or to different battalions
within the same Brigade or Special Court-Martial Convening Authority,
there must be a clear identification of a neutral decision-maker to resolve any
inconsistent approaches to mediation from the disparate commands. In these
situations, all commanders must agree to offer the mediation in order to start
the process.146
If, on the other hand, respective commanders cannot agree, the disputing
Soldiers should be provided with an opportunity to appeal to the Commander
that exercises authority over these two subordinate commands. If the
commanders cannot agree on the utility of mediation in that particular case,
and the appellate authority denies the appeal seeking mediation, the process
simply reverts to traditional forms of action under the UCMJ. This may, in
effect, disable service-members from resolving a conflict in a way they
would prefer. However, this loss of control (as perceived by the disputants)
should be balanced against the need to sustain the commander's mandated
mission to ensure the good order and discipline of his or her forces and his or
her MCM-granted jurisdictional authority.147
iv. The Commander's Veto
145 See R.C.M. 401, Discussion.
146 Thanks to Colonel Anthony Febbo for noting a relevant concern here: such
cross-command coordination is not without practical challenges, especially if one or more
of the affected units is deployed, and such difficulty may chill desire to turn to mediation-
based solutions. Nevertheless, commanders would naturally consider such challenges
under R.C.M. 306 in orthodox judicial decision-making, and it is reasonable to assume
that-if such concerns can be overcome prior to courts-martial-this challenge is not
insurmountable and simply factors into the command's discretionary choice to offer
mediation under the circumstances.
147 R.C.M. 306(a).
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Assuming a commander does turn to mediation as a disposition choice, it
is important to note that the CAMP construct would not narrow the options
of the commander if the dispute or conflict fails to resolve itself. A
commander would still retain the authority to impose administrative
corrective measures, nonjudicial punishment, or to prefer charges.
Alternative options may be appropriate when:
* disputing service-members choose not to participate in mediation; or
* disputing service-members fail to arrive at mediated settlement in a
reasonable time; or
* the mediated settlement agreement is unreasonably inconsistent with
the purposes of military law; or
* one or more of the disputing service-members fails to meet the
conditions set forth in the mediated agreement, signed by the parties.
This "veto" power should not, however, simply be a form of counter-
attack applied when the commander is dissatisfied with the process. If
mediation, as a system, is to resolve a conflict in a way that detangles
problems at the lowest possible level, frees the chain-of-command from
engaging in lengthy and unpredictable punitive effoits, and maximizes the
potential for team-building and restoring or strengthening unit cohesion, 148
then the system assumes voluntary participation and a good faith effort to
settle, but does not guarantee or impose a mandate to settle. It assumes the
terms of any settlement will be in the best interest of the disputing parties and
does not require that the best interest of the Army be a factor. 149 So, if the
148 See supra Part I.
149 A system intended to produce a binary result like a guilty or innocent verdict, or
a system which, in a sense, demands the participation of both victim and offender, and a
system which-by its very purpose and design-promotes the best interests of the Army
is called a court-martial. By its nature, a court-martial can have a splintering or
divisive-not cohesive-effect; it burdens the chain-of-command and imposes otherwise
unplanned logistical and evidentiary requirements on both leaders and Soldiers, and it
funnels a conflict or dispute upward and outward, away from the disputants' control and
into the discretion and eventual judgment of others, be they panel members or judges.
While the protection of victims by the blanketing protective embrace of a state's
prosecution of the offender is the common and widely-honored tradition in Western
criminal procedure, it is by no means the only viable method by which those interests and
victims can be protected. Sometimes, as discussed throughout this article, ensuring that
the victim's right to engineer his or her own "justice" by granting them ownership over
the means of dispute resolution is a more fair and appropriate system.
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commander were to take action because the Soldiers chose not to participate,
or because they could not agree to a settlement, or agreed but because it was,
in the commander's opinion, unreasonably inconsistent with the purposes of
military law, then the commander is undermining the very purpose and value
of the mediation process; the commander should have never opted for this
route as an initial choice.
v. Confidentiality
One significant concern often raised about a mediation program is the
problem of what information, shared during a mediation session, ought to be
"privileged" or confidential. If a mediation fails to resolve the dispute, can
the prosecution or the opposing party use statements or admissions made
during mediation against the party making it? Ultimately, the issue is one of
balancing the interests of privacy-perhaps one of the factors influencing the
person to seek a mediated solution in the first place-against the "public"
interest in presenting the fact-finder with probative evidence for use in
adjudication.150
A related question is the extent to which "admissions" 5 1 may be relevant
and admissible at a subsequent judicial hearing regardless of the mediated
outcome. In this vein, a derivative issue is whether the mediator can or
should be available as a witness against one of the parties during subsequent
legal proceedings.1 52 Should there be a mediator-disputant privilege in the
same form as a psychotherapist-patient privilege to help ensure mediation is
meaningfully confidential in a way that parties likely expect? 53
150 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir.
1980).
151 Under the Military Rules of Evidence, an "admission" is a "self-incriminating
statement falling short of an acknowledgment of guilt, even if it was intended by its
maker to be exculpatory." See MIL. R. EviD. 304(c)(2).
152 See, e.g., Michael L. Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of
Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 1 (1988).
153 MIL. R. EvID. 513 provides a patient, who has received services from a
psychotherapist, with the privilege of refusing to disclose, and precluding that
psychotherapist from disclosing, any confidential communication that the patient made in
the course of facilitating diagnosis or for the purpose of treating his or her "mental or
emotional condition."
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One solution to this problem is a generally applicable privilege granted
to all the parties, including the mediator. 154 That is, each party (or the
mediator) can refuse to disclose any "mediation communication," and
prevent others from disclosing such information for the purpose of
admissibility of evidence in a legal proceeding or during the discovery phase
of that proceeding. Not only is this privilege analogous in many ways to the
common-law derived privileges between certain types of parties we find in
the Rules of Evidence, 155 but such a disclosure rule is similar to existing
walls that both federal and military law erect around certain kinds of
conversation, like "compromise negotiations," which shield statements made
from being used as proof of liability (though other uses may be
permissible).156
Notwithstanding these protections, the wary commander worried that the
CAMP scheme would provide too much opportunity for the spiteful or
mischievous disputant to "game" the system could take solace in that this
privilege could be waived, affirmatively by the parties, assuming all consent
("I waive my privilege against disclosure"), or through misconduct during
the mediation session (e.g., using the session to plan, attempt to commit or
commit a crime [e.g., threatening to inflict bodily harm on another] or
conceal an ongoing criminal activity).157
Granting such a privilege, or establishing a rule of confidentiality, can be
justified on several grounds. It creates an incentive to engage in a problem-
solving discussion-if a party believes its dispute is too private, or
embarrassing, a provision for confidentiality encourages sincerity and
154 See, e.g., the Uniform Mediation Act, §§ 4-6 (2003),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/umafinalstyled.cfm (a collaborative effort between the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association's Section on Dispute Resolution).
155 See, e.g., MIL. R. EVID. 502 ("Lawyer-client privilege"), 503 (Communications
to clergy), and 504 (Husband-wife privilege).
156 See FED. R. EviD. 408(a) and MIL. R. EvID. 408(1). One clear illustration of just
how protective this shield is U.S. v. Jenson, 25 M.J. 284 (C.M.A. 1987), in which the
appellate court reversed a trial court's conviction of an Army Specialist accused of
sodomy and rape in part because the trial judge erroneously admitted a pre-trial
settlement agreement into evidence for the prosecution.
157 Creating and enforcing an independent duty to disclose and report threats to
others made during a mediation is a common practice in many states, and is modeled
after the reasoning in the famous case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976): a reasonable belief that disclosing the mediation communication
would be necessary to prevent a party from committing a crime likely to result in
substantial physical harm would trigger such an affirmative duty.
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frankness. 158  Second, it broadens the scope of the conversation.
Deliberately expanding the menu of topics open for discussion-beyond the
specific manifested conflict-is a tactic often employed in negotiation in
order to discover potential areas where agreement is more probable, which
may later support a more robust agreement that encompasses the original
"target" issue. A provision for confidentiality could reduce the normal fear
that acquiescence, accommodation, or acceptance of certain arguments might
later be used adversely against them in court, and with that safety net in
mind, participants may work more cooperatively toward a mutually-
acceptable solution.159
These values, arguably, outweigh their competition: an open-ended or
unrestricted use of mediation statements as possible evidence later on at trial
would simply chill the disputant Soldiers' conduct toward one another,
freezing it to a point indistinguishable from an adversarial litigation.160
Confidentiality, enforced through an evidentiary privilege of some scope, is a
promise laced throughout the very structure and intent for mediations;
without some mechanism to ensure privacy, disputant Soldiers and
commanders would find it "appreciably more difficult to achieve the goals of
mediation."l61 How wide or narrow that scope of the privilege may be is a
question that deserves future thought and ample discussion. Specific
challenges to confidentiality, based on the assumed consequences of
privilege rule, are taken up in Part IV.B.
vi. Procedure
The fundamental purpose of an institutionalized mediation system, such
as the CAMP construct, is to provide an avenue for commanders and
disputing Soldiers to siphon off certain conflicts before they escalate to the
point where punitive action becomes advisable. The CAMP retains the
commander's authority to (1) not offer mediation; (2) withdraw an offer; (3)
terminate the mediation during the process for good cause; (4) effectively
veto the Soldiers' agreement; and (5) initiate administrative corrective
158 See Prigoff, supra note 152.
159 Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to
Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation
Participants, the Process, and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DIsp. RESOL. 1, 15-17.
160 Id. at 17 ("Candor is the dynamo that drives mediation.").
161 See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Company, 68 F.Supp. 2d 1110, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (citing Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1998)).
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measures, nonjudicial punishment, or UCMJ actions based on the
circumstances and facts then known. Furthermore, because the CAMP
operates outside the conventional MCM processes, such a mediation session
does not constitute a form of pre-trial agreement and does not implicate the
need for immunity from the General Court-Martial Convening Authority.16 2
The process and decisionmaking nodes of Track 1 are illustrated in Figure 1
below, applied to the hypothetical at the beginning of Part IV.A.
START HERE
Senior NCO verbally disrespects
CPT on duty in combat zone,
witnessed by junior Soldiers
YES
MSG and CPT participate in mediation
session, facilitated by mediator chosen
by the parties or drawn from existing
NO
MSG and CPT
mutually agree YES
to settlement
termsu>
Commander chooses to impose an
Administrative Corrective Measure on one
or both disputants, per MCM Part V.1g.,
or punishment via UCMJ Art. 15, or
preferral of charges for court-martial
A
VETO X
mander
ifies or
>esthe
-ement
162 See R.C.M. 704 and 705.
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Figure 1: COMMANDER'S ADJUDICATION THROUGH MEDIATION
(Track 1, CAMP)
In the illustration above, I depict a generic decision sequence that charts
command-identified disputes through the mediation process, or Track I of
CAMP. Just as with generic mediation in a criminal law context, the
frequency and scope of decisions by the disputing Soldiers themselves
distinguishes this process from traditional military justice decisions by the
command. Once the commander has opted 63 to offer mediation to MSG
Williams and CPT Jackson, the Soldiers in the opening hypothetical, both of
these disputants have the ability to accept or reject the offer, much like a
Soldier has the ability to accept punishment under Article 15 or to reject it,
forcing the commander to drop the issue or prefer charges for a court-martial.
Unlike the Article 15 analogy, however, a choice to reject the mediation offer
simply returns the disposition decision to the hands of the commander, at
which point he or she has the same extensive menu of choices and discretion
they currently possess under military law.
There are also three other occasions when the decision falls back to the
command. Assume the parties agree to mediate. Despite the efforts of the
mediator to aide them in identifying areas of common concern and building
ways to mutually resolve their conflicts, the parties cannot agree to terms. At
some point, the parties themselves or the mediator must see that further
efforts-even if made in good faith-simply will not be fruitful and may end
up being counterproductive. Consequently, this commander-referred
mediation session closes unresolved, returning the dispute back to the
commander for action, or no action. 164
Or, assume that the parties do come to an agreement that they believe
satisfies their concerns. In order to ensure that the agreement does not
impose some unlawful obligation or burden on one or both parties, and to
ensure that the agreement is "warranted, appropriate, and fair,"165 and does
163 After consideration of the factors listed in R.C.M. 306 and the modified factors
described in Part III.C., supra.
164 An often-underappreciated fact about the discretion afforded to commanders is
that they can, legally, choose to take no adverse action against a Soldier in their
"jurisdiction," regardless of the gravity of the offense. See R.C.M. 306. Whether the
next higher commander disagrees and withholds disposition over that Soldier or offense
is another matter. Even experienced commanders are not immune from assuming they
must address a conflict or misconduct with direct and swift action-whether
administrative or punitive.
165 R.C.M. 306.
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not undermine the overall sense of good order and discipline within the unit,
the commander has the opportunity to review the agreement.166 If he or she
believes the agreement invades these interests, then that commander may
"veto" the agreement, returning the conflict back to their innate discretion for
another choice.
Or, alternatively, assume that the parties have agreed to terms and the
commander has "ratified" the agreement and deems it fair and appropriate
under the circumstances because it reinforces good order and discipline. Yet,
at some future point, one or both of the parties "breaches the contract" of the
settlement and fails to abide by their mutual agreement. Depending on the
same RCM 306 factors that guide commanders whenever faced with
evidence of an offense, and the same factors relied upon in deciding to send
the issue to mediation from the start, then-once more-the dispute retreats
back to the hands of the commander for a disposition choice.
In contrast to Track 1, Soldier-identified disputes could be resolved
through mediation separate from the chain-of-command, which would be
known as Track 2. The chain-of-command remains largely detached from
investigating or disposing of the misconduct unless the parties are
dissatisfied with the bargain, or if there is a "breach" of the agreement at
some future point. One or both parties, for any of these reasons, may resort
to notifying the chain-of-command. This notification would then trigger
either command-imposed mediation, or any other appropriate disposition.
The Track 2 process is illustrated below in Figure 2.
This illustration depicts a generic decision sequence that charts Soldier-
identified disputes through a mediation process. It is important to recognize
the dominant feature of bilateral or mutual decision-making between the
disputing Soldiers that does not involve a disposition decision or
investigation by the chain-of-command. There are, at least as depicted in this
version, three decision points (depicted by gray diamonds)-all of which
166 Another area for discussion is whether (and to what extent) the commander
should rely on legal counsel from a servicing or organic Judge Advocate when reviewing
the agreement. Further questions spring naturally from that answer: should the Judge
Advocate be a different attorney than the one initially advising the commander, or should
the attorney be one other than the trial counsel to preclude a potential conflict or
appearance of bias should the dispute devolve into a traditional court-martial? To what
extent should the attorney's review become "part of the file" as it does for a legal review
of an investigation conducted under AR 15-6 or AR 735-5? Should an unbiased Judge
Advocate be present during the mediation to advise the mediator analogous to a
Separation Board's non-voting legal advisor under AR 635-200 ("Active Duty Enlisted
Administrative Separations") or 600-8-24 ("Officer Transfer and Discharges")? Or as
impartial advisor to either disputant? Or as the mediator themselves?
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involve the disputing Soldiers and none of which include the Command.
Under this track, mediation is an additional legal dispute resolution option
which operates entirely outside the commander's "judicial function" and
authority. 167 Viscerally, this disconnecting of the commander from the
disputing Soldiers' conflict may seem like an anathema; without the problem
being illuminated for a commander, one could argue, the unit's ability to
enforce good order and discipline is blinded.
If chain-of-command is unaware
of the conflict, the disrespect
incident remains unresolved; if
NO one or both disputants raise the
issue to the chain-of-command,
then Track 1 process begins
MSG and CPT use command-
provided resources to identify
potential mediators available to
facilitate their session
if chain-of-command is unaware of the
conflict, the disrespect incident
remains unknown but resolved in a
way that has satisfied both affected
Soldiers-a risk that the Command
accepts by virtue of not being
omnipotent.
167 See supra note 93.
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Figure 2: COMMANDER'S ADJUDICATION THROUGH MEDIATION
(Track 2, CAMP)
Indeed, when a Soldier files a restricted report of a sexual assault with
certain agencies or officials on a military installation (Sexual Assault
Response Coordinator, victim advocate, chaplain, or a healthcare provider),
commanders are not notified and do not possess this information.168 This
reporting shield allows the Soldier to receive medical treatment and follow-
up care while bypassing the chain-of-command and military law enforcement
investigations-at least giving the victim an opportunity to determine the
scope and extent to which they wish to trigger or to participate in an
investigation.169 While the crime may go uninvestigated and ultimately
unpunished, the victim of the crime may achieve what he or she believes to
be the appropriate degree of attention and reconciliation. What the chain-of-
command loses in deterrent effect and retribution, it gains in fostering the
trauma victim's sense of individual case ownership and healing.170 This
same balancing process would be present within a mediation alternative that
diverts or shields misconduct from the eyes of the chain-of-command.
In sketching out the rough parameters of both tracks in this proposed
CAMP system, this article addresses some of the primary attributes that
distinguish it most sharply from traditional military justice approaches.
Nevertheless, even necessary or foundational elements of such a system-the
involvement of the commander in the initial disposition offer or the extent of
confidentiality-are subject to gradation and could be molded into any
number of alternative shapes and designs. Regardless of CAMP's final
configuration, though, any institutionalization of a new system is necessarily
confronted by the existing system's natural inertia. Addressing and
appraising the most significant potential criticisms of institutionalizing
mediation is the challenge taken up below in Part IV.B.
3. Open Questions
Some obvious logistical hurdles are not addressed in this article but
would certainly require planning and resourcing if CAMP were to be
seriously considered. One could argue, for instance, that a local Office of the
Staff Judge Advocate (even at an installation that supports a Corps or
168 See AR 600-20 (Army Command Policy), 8-4c.
169 Id. at Appendix H, H-4a.
170 Id.
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Division) currently lacks the personnel to effectively manage and supervise
such a program. A brief rejoinder: CAMP could easily be a designed as a
pilot program intended, in part, to identify necessary resources for eventual
expansion. As a test program, CAMP would not unduly burden existing
personnel resources in even a moderate or average-sized SJA office. The
obvious purpose in recommending a trial period with a test unit (maybe as
small as a company or battalion) is to gather data on logistical challenges
impeding a successful program before it expands, if at all.
The pilot program could identify and explore various options and
reformulations of the numerous procedural decisions that lead into, or result
from, the mediation session (as sketched out in Figures 1 and 2): where to
mediate?'71 And does the decision change depending on which "Track" is
used? How to train neutral Soldiers in the techniques of mediation (and from
what ranks should they be drawn)?172 And how should the mediator's rank
compare to the mediating disputants, and how to protect rank from creating
conflicts of interest, and how to prevent one disputant's rank from being an
"expression of power and domination" toward the other, lower-ranking
disputant? 73 How much time to allow for mediation before lack of progress
justifies resorting to other, traditional, methods? Should the mediator
selection process factor in the mediator's (or the Soldiers') gender, or race, or
Military Occupational Specialty, or any other identifying characteristic or
experience? Should mediator qualifications mirror those of court-martial
panel members?l 74 Should there be a selection process at all, or should
selection depend on the preference of the disputing Soldiers? What role
should the unit's servicing Judge Advocate or legal advisor play? Should the
commander permit the disputants to bring legal counsel with them to the
171 Selecting a location for a mediation would depend on the availability of space
that is private (and therefore conducive to the frank communication necessary for
effective problem-solving) and easily accessible to both parties wishing to mediate, and
that reinforces the neutrality of the mediator, and does not unreasonably detract from the
mediating Soldiers' ability to train or perform other military duties.
172 See, e.g., Donald T. Weckstein, Mediator Certification: Why and How, 30 U.S.F.
L. REv. 757, 781-84 (1996).
173 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale ofInnovation Co-Opted or "The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1991).
174 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (2012). Theoretically, a court-martial convening authority,
with the help of subordinate commanders and his or her Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate, select those Soldiers and officers "best qualified for the duty by reason of age,
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament."
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mediation?175 And once a lawyer is present, how much advocacy-rather
than subdued consultation-should be permitted? How do the procedures
change if more than two disputants are involved? If the procedures change,
are substantive rights impinged-if so, to what extent? Should each unit
maintain its own cohort of qualified mediators as a standing pool for a
discrete time, in the same way that a General Court-Martial Convening
Authority maintains standing lists of court-martial panel members under
Article 25, UCMJ?l 76 Could, or should, mediators be civilians-if so,
should they be limited to Department of Defense employees, or might a unit
"outsource" for mediation talent beyond the gates of the Post? What if one
disputing Soldier is willing to hire a professional civilian mediator-can they
seek contribution for the cost from the other Soldier? Should the
Commander also be afforded discretion on approving of the mediator? Must
the mediated agreement be in writing? How would the CAMP process
function-or will it not function at all-in an extended field or training
environment? What challenges would remain or disappear if CAMP were
transplanted to deployed environment?
Some of these additional questions-the answers to which may have a
degree of influence over the both the process and substance of a mediation
and the rights of the disputing Soldiers-are addressed in the Appendices
that follow the main body of this article. Appendix A is a "script" that a
commander may follow when offering mediation to the disputing Soldiers
under Track 1 of CAMP. It is largely mirrored on the standard and widely-
used Article 15 script. This document allows the commander to explain
mediation to the Soldiers in such as to give them fair notice of the procedure
and what the costs and benefits are likely to be. It attempts to educate the
Soldier on expected conduct during the mediation, potential results of the
mediation, the confidential nature of the mediation, and the ratifying role that
the commander maintains throughout the process. The script's objective is to
175 See Uniform Mediation Act, Section 10 ("An attorney or other individual
designated by a party may accompany that party to and participate in a mediation. A
waiver of participation given before the mediation may be rescinded.") In contrast, a
mediator in California family courts has the ultimate discretion to exclude attorneys if
"appropriate or necessary." See Cal. Fam. Code Section 3182.176 See Major Stephen A. Lamb, The Court-Martial Panel Selection Process: A
Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REv. 103 (1992); 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (2012). A
derivative question is whether any standing pool should also include mediators qualified
based their unique experiences that may parallel those of the mediating parties or may
make them particularly well-suited for a being a mediator-in effect, creating a "blue
ribbon" pool of potential neutrals.
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ensure that the Soldier's acceptance of the offer is knowledgeable,
intelligent, and voluntary. Appendix B is a template for an "Agreement to
Mediate," designed to confirm that the Soldier accepts the mediation offer in
a way that clearly demonstrates that it was based on a thoughtful and
voluntary consideration of the facts and attributes of mediation. Like the
commander's script, it reinforces the attribute of command discretion
throughout the process, and acknowledges acceptance of the potentially
adverse consequences should the Soldier fail to participate in good faith, or
fail to adhere to the mutually agreed-upon terms. Appendix C is a template
for a "Mediated Agreement," designed to provide the disputing Soldiers an
opportunity, with the assistance of the mediator, to articulate the settlement
they have mutually reached, and re-acknowledges the ratification and veto
power of the commander.
Mediation represents an unconventional, but potentially innovative,
approach to resolving certain disputes and conflicts among Soldiers "using
new forms within old structures."1 77 By building this option into the pre-
disciplinary decision-making process (Track 1), commanders improve their
choice of options to deal with conflict. By providing mediation as a resource
for self-identifying Soldiers (Track 2), commanders send clear signals that
problem-solving need not be solely implemented by the command, but that
Soldiers can have a chance to resolve lower level conflicts that might detract
from their professional and personal development. In either case, this
program has significant potential to free up valuable time and resources, to
promote durable problem-solving at the lowest level, and to foster better
communication, team-building and mission success. This alternative
approach to finding the most "warranted, appropriate, and fair"178 decision
expands the disposition authority of commanders without unreasonable cost.
B. Mediation and its Discontents: Addressing Plausible Military-
Specific Constraints and Criticism
1. The Infringement Argument: Mediation Interferes with and
Impedes the Commander's Use of Traditional Disciplinary
Mechanisms Under the MCM
To prove mediation is an unreasonable interference with currently lawful
command authority, its procedures or outcomes must either (1) limit the
177 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 173, at 3.
178 R.C.M. 306.
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choices afforded to commanders and thus countermand the Rules for Courts-
Martial; or (2) unreasonably balloon Soldiers' rights to such an extreme that
commanders lose their authority to dispose of misconduct, again in violation
of basic tenets of military law and order. But an appropriately-designed
mediation alternative need not fall into either trap. 179 A mediation system
driven by multiple "decision-points" and multiple actors would, in effect,
expand the choices and widen the discretion for commanders. Such a system
could be viable at any point after the command has taken administrative or
punitive steps, such as counseling or nonjudicial punishment, or before it has
begun to consider using such measures. In other words, there are multiple
"decision points" at which time a commander may refer a case to mediation,
none of which preclude the command's traditional recourses under the MCM.
If, for example, the disputing Soldiers fail to agree, or if the commander is
dissatisfied with the agreement they do make, the commander may still
exercise any other option that he or she believes stands a better chance at
resolving the matter-even if it means a unilateral imposition of an adverse
action on one or all of the disputing Soldiers.
It may be helpful to analogize the CAMP as an "administrative
corrective measure," like written counseling sessions from the leaders,
rehabilitative transfers, corrective training, admonishments, and letters of
reprimand. Mediation is simply another alternative within the long list of
available recourses that a chain-of-command may consider. Conceptually, it
fits squarely within the language of the MCM:
Article 15 and Part V of this Manual do not apply to include, or limit
use of administrative corrective measures that promote efficiency and good
order and discipline such as counseling, admonitions, reprimands,
exhortations, disapprovals, criticisms, censures, reproofs, rebukes, extra
military instruction, and administrative withholding of privileges. 180
This section of the Manual for Courts-Martial (notably, the use of "such
as" before listing several forms of corrective measures) leaves room for
creative application of a commander's authority to solve problems with
specified or unspecified measures. 18 1 While this list only includes traditional
179 See Appendix A.
180 MCM, Part V, [ 1(g). (emphasis added)
181 Compare Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Baldwin, Disciplinary Infractions
Involving Active Guard/Reserve Enlisted Soldiers: Some Thoughts for Commanders and
Judge Advocates, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1986, at 8-10 (discussing administrative corrective
measures and discipline options provided to Reserve Component Commanders
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"top-down" or unilateral, command-driven solutions, there is nothing in this
provision that prevents the use of unconventional problem-solving
techniques provided that they "promote efficiency and good order and
discipline." In this sense, the CAMP construct can be thought of in terms of
an "administrative corrective measure" and-just as with the traditional
examples-mediation neither supplants nor restricts a commander's
discretionary authority to use any or all other means permitted. Nor does it
unjustifiably expand Soldiers' rights to the detriment of command authority.
For example, the commander may "veto" or "ratify" a mediated agreement,
as well as initiate other measures as the context demands (this is discussed
above in Part III). The CAMP framework merely provides a different
procedure for sending the same message but achieving potentially better
results than the more traditional tools for ending Soldier-to-Soldier disputes.
There is no interference, therefore, emanating from the CAMP's processes
that unreasonably cloud a commander's traditional authority.
2. The Blurry Heuristic Argument: Where Should Commanders Draw
a Line Between Mediation-Appropriate Fact Patterns and Mediation-
Inappropriate Crime?
There is no bright line. The appropriate standard, on a case-by-case
basis, is a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. Rather than giving
commanders a clear rule for when mediation may be appropriate,
commanders should look to the situation holistically to decide whether or
when mediation may be appropriate. This imprecise but flexible standard is
no different from the majority of administrative and punitive decisions
currently available under the MCM. In the context of deciding among
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, administrative corrective measures,
or charges under the UCMJ, the only guidance commanders have in using
their discretion is that it should be considered on an "individual basis" after
considering "the nature of the offense, the record of the servicemember, the
needs for good order and discipline, and the effect of nonjudicial punishment
on the servicemember and the servicemember's record."1 82
responsible for Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Soldiers), and AR 27-10, 3-3(a) (using
the language "[i]ncluded among nonpunitive measures are . . .").
182 See MCM Part V, 1(d)(1). The drafter's "Discussion" of R.C.M. 306(b) lists
several more factors a commander should consider in disposing of charges, including
possible motives of the accuser, reluctance of the victim to testify, cooperation of the
accused, concurrent jurisdiction with civilian authorities, and the availability or
admissibility of evidence in the case.
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Rather than a liability, this lack of a "bright line" standard is considered a
strength in the military justice system because of the elastic set of possible
responses provided to the commander. Whether we view mediation in the
CAMP construct as another illustration of an "administrative corrective
measure" or as a wholly new option equal to any other disposition choice, the
same kind of guidance can and should direct a commander's decision-
making.
To this end, the CAMP construct provides the commander with a list of
ten factors to consider before making an offer of mediation (see Part III.C.,
supra). These factors are derived from the MCMs discussion of commander
discretion under an Article 15 and the factors described in RCM 306, but
relates them to the context of mediation. One factor, for instance, is the
professional and personal relationship between the disputing Soldiers. For
cases in which the Soldiers neither work closely together, nor have any
customary or personal relationship for which efforts should be made to
rebuild or sustain, mediation may not be appropriate and commanders should
instead consider other options. If, however, such a relationship does exist,
how the dispute originated may influence the means by which the command
resolves it. Another factor commanders should consider under CAMP, but
not necessarily under traditional RCM 306 decision-making, is whether unit
cohesion and team-building-i.e., another way of saying strong interpersonal
relationships-might be disrupted by imposing traditional command-driven
discipline.
3. The Cloaking Misconduct Argument: Rules of Confidentiality
Shield Bad Behavior from the Command
Mediation may keep some facts or statements from the scrutiny of the
command and may be unavoidably lost for use as admissible evidence at a
later court-martial. This is not nearly the calamity it may appear to be at first
blush. It is fundamentally the same protection we already afford to
incriminating statements that have been coerced or were made in the absence
of Article 31 warnings.183 MRE 408, as an analogy, also shields "evidence
of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations." Likewise,
incriminating statements made during "privileged communications" between
husband and wife, lawyer and client, and clergy and penitent are shielded.184
While in those cases the prosecution of a crime becomes potentially more
183 See 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2011).
184 See MCM, Appendix 22, Section V.
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challenging or impossible, the interests protected are considered to outweigh
their evidentiary utility: in other words, just as in MRE 403, the probative
value is outweighed by more substantial competing interests, like protecting
the maker of the statement from unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues.
The fact that incriminating content of a mediation dialogue may be
screened from view is largely irrelevant in light of two foundational aspects
of CAMP: first, the built-in discretion afforded to the commander; second,
confidentiality provisions that trigger or permit disclosure of content in
relevant situations. In the command-referred version of CAMP (Track 1),
mediation only begins if the commander chooses it (Figure 1, supra). It is a
discretionary approach that can be used in lieu of, or in addition to,
traditional measures. If a commander chooses to refer the dispute involving
interpersonal misconduct to mediation in lieu of other discipline, the
commander does so after considering numerous factors and the general
standard described above and thus has determined that the risk of losing
evidence for some undetermined or potential future case is outweighed by the
benefits and advantages of mediation. For example, what the commander
loses in terms of potential admissions (defined in MRE 304(c)), he or she
may gain in fast, durable settlements of conflict. Alternatively, if a
commander chooses to offer the mediation referral in addition to other forms
of corrective action or discipline, he or she has already built a record on
which to substantiate that disciplinary action, and therefore has little need for
any potential evidence that might accrue as a result of the mediation
conference. As a result, the confidentiality of a mediation proceeding does
not hamper the government's ability to collect evidence for later use.
Likewise, evidentiary concerns are ameliorated in Soldier-identified
disputes (Track 2). The self-identified version of CAMP mediation is closely
analogous to the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). 85 The Army has
institutionalized a normative trust that the results of certain biochemical
testing for alcohol and drug abuse, categorized as "limited use" evidence,
should be largely unavailable for legal proceedings or is of narrow usefulness
at an administrative hearing. 186 The stated objective for this program is to
"facilitate the ID of Soldiers, who abuse alcohol and other drugs by
encouraging ID through self-referral [and] to facilitate the rehabilitation of
those abusers who demonstrate the potential for rehabilitation and
retention."187
185 See AR 600-85.
186 Id. at 10-11.
187 Id. at 10-11.
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ASAP's objective is similar to the purpose of CAMP's Track 2, which is
designed to encourage disputing Soldiers (who may have engaged in
misconduct stemming from an interpersonal dispute) to self-identify and
affirmatively work toward a resolution with an eye to rehabilitation of the
interpersonal relationship. In both scenarios, the Army benefits by
developing safer, more stable, Soldiers and more cohesive teams
notwithstanding the earlier misconduct, drug use, or conflict. ASAP's
general approach to confidentiality (limiting knowledge of the Soldier's
participation to a select few leaders and program staff and prohibiting certain
results from use in court or for some purposes in administrative hearings)' 88
is a good model for the confidentiality necessary for effective mediations.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to presume certain conditions will call for a
good faith use of relevant statements or facts learned only through a
mediation session. Both the Federal Rule and Military Rule of Evidence 408
provide for the admissibility of statements made during "compromise
negotiations," if offered to prove bias, prejudice, or obstruction of an
investigation or prosecution. Mediation in the UCMJ context can certainly
be engineered in such a way as to allow for the waiver of a confidentiality
protection. Waiving confidentiality could mirror ASAP's approach: ASAP
counselors may reveal to the command or other proper authority knowledge
of illegal acts that impact the mission, national security, or the health and
welfare of others.189 CAMP, likewise, could endorse a confidentiality rule
that provides a justification for disclosure. Adopting the Uniform Mediation
Act (sections 4-6) approach, for instance, would presume confidentiality
applicable to all parties, waivable either directly and by uniform consent, or
through misconduct during the mediation session itself. Some statements
may be intriguing enough to pique the mediator's concern: e.g., statements
that indicate one or more Soldiers are planning a crime: attempting to
commit or committing a crime; or are concealing an ongoing criminal
activity. Such statements would not be shielded by the general rule of
confidentiality, and would be a risk that the Soldiers knowingly volunteer to
accept when they agree to mediate (Appendix 2). As a result, these
statements would be admissible as a hearsay exception in a subsequent legal
proceeding under MRE 804(b)(3) ("statements against interest"); the
mediator may be called to recount the statement and which could be
admissible under MRE 304(h)(1) ("voluntary oral confession or admission of
the accused may be proved by the testimony of anyone who heard the
188 Id. at 6-7(a).
189 Id. at 10-12(b).
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accused make it, even if it was reduced to a writing and the writing is not
accounted for").
Therefore, CAMP neither unduly burdens the investigative and
disciplinary tools available to the command, nor precludes appropriate
disclosure if necessary for future criminal proceedings against one or both of
the mediating parties.
4. The Underdeveloped Law Argument: Military Common Law
Will Grow Stagnant Without the Constant Watering ofNew
Cases
Another concern associated with ADR approaches is that systems like
mediation prevent trial and appellate judges from weighing in and thus
applying, expanding, or diminishing case law that interprets common law
principles or statutory prohibitions. This observation is, no doubt, true and
grounded in reality. Fewer cases decided by judges and juries will yield
fewer appellate decisions, and thus a smaller reservoir of facts on which the
common law will develop. However true, it is a red-herring in that it
distracts us from the real question raised by proposing mediation as an
alternative complement to orthodox justice: is a given fact-pattern
appropriately decided by the venue of a court-martial, or nonjudicial
punishment, or administrative corrective measure, or mediation, under the
case-specific circumstances?
If this "underdeveloped law" argument were at all persuasive, the growth
and universal reliance on nonjudicial punishment across all armed services
for minor offenses would not be continually promulgated by executive orders
in version after version of the MCM, or acquiesced to by the military courts.
Clearly, the nature of military justice-as discussed above, philosophically
guided by the principles of military discipline for mission-accomplishment
and commander-prerogative-has traditionally justified the use of criminal
procedures even when those procedures may otherwise avoid appellate
review and the evolution of the law.
Moreover, nothing within a mediation system-including CAMP-
necessarily precludes military legal advisors from convincing commanders
that the interests of justice (to include the assumed future evolution of the
law) would be better served through the uncertainty and duration of trial
litigation rather than mediation. Ultimately, given the intrinsically vital role
that commanders play in the current military justice system, the ex ante
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concern about mediation malnourishing the law writ large is equally
unpersuasive and unsupportable.
5. The Superfluous Argument: Military Leaders as Innate
Mediators
CAMP could be condemned as unwanted leadership by some other
name. Leaders are expected to be highly invested in their Soldiers' lives and
should already be performing the job of an informal "mediator" as part of the
basic skill set expected of Noncommissioned Officers and Officers.
However, existing disciplinary tools under the MCM also mirror leadership
responsibilities, making this criticism not particularly weighty. Generally,
military leaders are expected to engage in individual and group mentoring,
counseling, and problem-solving. The CAMP scheme is not a substitute for,
or an unnecessary addition to, basic leadership actions, just as MCM-
approved tools do not replace basic leadership actions. For example, verbal
counseling, written counseling, admonishments, letters of reprimand, and
Article 15 nonjudicial punishment give leaders a way to articulate the
command's attentiveness to a problem and provide a way to craft solutions to
interpersonal conflicts and disputes that otherwise diminish the ability to
accomplish their mission or impede the unit's readiness.
These tools are similar to the skill set we hope that leaders already
employ: the articulated communication between leader and Soldier (using
these tools) is precisely what should be happening "off line" as part of a
leader's effort in developing the professional competence of his or her team.
Yet, when used properly, these mechanisms are considered invaluable tools
that augment and reinforce other means that commanders may use to
promote justice and enforce discipline within their formations. But, as
described above, there are some cases that benefit more from a mediated
resolution than they would from command-imposed solutions: specifically,
relational-based conflict based on underlying interpersonal tensions that
would not necessarily be resolved through a commander's judge-like
decision under traditional UCMJ authority. Rather than resorting to
traditional punishment as a blanket solution for the misconduct that is
triggered by such conflict, the CAMP framework gives commanders criteria
to determine whether the problem is really of a type that could be resolved
using mediation. Moreover, mediation enables the Soldiers, in appropriate
situations, to "police themselves" from the bottom-up rather than imposing
solely "top-down" solutions.
In this way, the CAMP scheme is likely to be a time- and resource-
saving mechanism as contrasted against generic court-martial preparation or
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formal investigations: no need for gathering admissible evidence,
interviewing witnesses, pulling military witnesses away from their duties, or
assigning military personnel for courtroom-related support. Moreover, the
reality is that much misconduct and many disputes are simply outside the
ability of the leadership to resolve. In many situations, for example, the
chain-of-command and other key leaders simply have other mission-related
priorities: higher visibility criminal activity or disciplinary needs, training or
deployment preparation, or actual combat operations in a theater of war.
Such priorities restrict the time and resources they can reasonably devote to
"lower visibility" misconduct and systemic interpersonal conflict. These
scenarios may often be placed in the commander's "put off until another
day" file, resulting-often-in a continuation or escalation of conflict.190
The CAMP framework, on the other hand, provides leaders with a way to
maintain situational awareness of these problems, while still directing the
conflict into the most efficient avenue for resolving it, at the earliest available
opportunity. 191 As a consequence, commanders may be able to craft and
transmit a message that the leadership is involved and ready to aide Soldiers
in preventing these "mission distracters" from worsening. Soldiers, receiving
this message, are signaled that the command climate is flexible and creative,
and able to work for the Soldiers' benefit. The result is not a hand-off of key
leader responsibilities to a faceless and alien system; rather, the CAMP
scheme only reinforces that pre-existing duty and provides the leader with an
effective way to execute it.
Another effective method, as an alternative to a formal system like
"CAMP," is providing instruction on mediation skills and neutral party
intervention to leaders. A system design approach, as advocated in this
article, need not be the only way in which mediation finds a home within
traditional military justice. In fact, it may not even be the easiest or most
efficient way. Designing an effective structure, through which stakeholders
(i.e., victims, offenders, the commander, and the unit as a whole) are able to
present their interests and positions in a way that is consistent with
underlying goals of the system takes time, resources, and a fair amount of
190 This prediction of time and resource-saving is based on observations drawn from
personal experience and discussions as a platoon leader, battalion staff officer, Trial
Counsel, and Command Judge Advocate.
191 Efficiency and economy of resources drive the treatment of "disposition of
charges" in R.C.M. 306-i.e., providing the immediate commander (usually) with the
discretion to dispose of offenses, considering a totality of the circumstances, with the
"goal" that the choice be "warranted, appropriate, and fair" (see Discussion to R.C.M.
306(b)).
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persuading of the traditional parties to try nontraditional approaches.192
Additionally, whether such structures afford an acceptable degree of
procedural transparency, accountability, and long-term satisfaction may be
extremely difficult to predict or assess. 193 Evaluating such acceptability is
further complicated when one tries to assess it from different vantage points,
like the commander who triggers the process, the parties undergoing the
process, or the unit whose cohesion may be affected one way or the other by
the process' outcome. The myriad counterarguments and open questions
raised above, in light of just one possible framework for military mediation
("CAMP"), illustrate many of the obvious institutional challenges. The
tension between the orthodox and the unconventional may be too great a
hurdle.
Rather, the virtues of mediation may be better translated through
systemic pedagogy-leadership training and education-than through system
design. Strangely, given that mediation is well-known among the practicing
bar and well-represented among law school curricula,194 none of the services
in the Armed Forces offer instruction to their Judge Advocate officers,
paralegals, or commanders on its potential application or utility to military
justice scenarios.195 The Department of Defense has largely ignored
192 See Smith & Martinez, et al., supra note 12, at 128-29 (proposing a method by
which practitioners and academics may evaluate the "quality" of various dispute system
designs).
193 Id
194 Id. at 124, n. 6.
195 Several military institutions offer training in the related field of negotiation, but
do so for areas of law or practice unrelated to military justice. The Air University hosts
the U.S. Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence, which teaches a course on
negotiation tactics to Air War College and Air Command and Staff College student
officers. The co-located Air Force Judge Advocate General (JAG) School also offers a
week-long "Negotiation and Appropriate Dispute Resolution Course" intended to
immerse students in Alternative Dispute Resolution processes and skills, though in the
limited context of federal labor and employment law, and environmental and acquisition
disputes. See Annual Bulletin, The Judge Advocate General's School Annual, Dickinson
Law Center, 2009-2010, available at http://www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/
AFD-090911-069.pdf (describing the NADRC as part of the Air Force JAG School
"Annual Bulletin"), and the 2012 NADRC "Course Announcement," on file with the
author. Similarly, the U.S. Military Academy hosts the West Point Negotiation Project
("WPNP"), and two of its academic departments enroll cadets in negotiation coursework.
These academic courses and the umbrella WPNP view the training of future officers in
negotiation skills as a critical component of leader development and tactical training, in
light of lessons-learned from the extensive reliance on such soft power during
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mediation for its uniformed employees, instead focusing its attention to
applying mediation and other ADR mechanisms to the field of contract law,
or in labor-management grievances, and Equal Employment Opportunity
issues. 196
Though lacking in precedent, the teaching of mediation skills in a
misconduct context to prospective uniformed neutral third parties-e.g.,
skills like active listening, facilitative framing of issues, identifying
mediation-ripe conflict, understanding differences between a position and
interest, articulating areas of consensus, drafting mediated agreements-is
not impossible to imagine or overly burdensome. Opportunities to convey
and practice these skills exist at various levels: the operational level, where
servicing judge advocates might direct the training themselves if they possess
academic or experiential knowledge of mediation, or procure mediation
experts to deliver the training; or the institutional level, at various resident
leadership schools for non-commissioned and commissioned officers, at the
Service Academies to collegiate officers-in-training, at the Service-specific
JAG courses, or as part of the curricula at Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC) programs.197 Though not a system or procedure, the spread of a
mediation skill set would unquestionably find informal venues for
application for relational misconduct, especially in combat deployments
where traditional formal military justice is often controversial or undesirable
because of operational constraints and priorities, and the need for quick,
decisive action and sustained unit cohesion are paramount concerns. 198
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. See West Point Negotiation Project, UNITED
STATES MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT, http://www.usma.edu/wpnp/SitePages/Home.
aspx; Red Book, STATES MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POlNT, http://www.usma.edu/
curriculum/RedBook/AY1 3_RedBook.pdf (listing course offerings by department).
196 "Conflict Management and Mediation Model," supra, note 52 (discussing the
Navy's civilian employee dispute resolution system and the joint Defense Equal
Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)).
197 The author developed and presented such a skill-building workshop and seminar
to senior staff at his former brigade headquarters, while deployed in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom 10/Operation New Dawn in 2010. The author developed and subsequently
presented a similar workshop and seminar to cadets studying negotiation in two academic
departments at the United States Military Academy: the departments of Social Science
and Behavioral Science & Leadership, affiliated with the "West Point Negotiation
Project," in 2012. Class notes, curriculum, and materials on file with the author.
198 For an excellent analysis and empirical study of factors considered by
commanders when deploying military justice (as well as legal, cultural, institutional, and
logistical complications) to combat zones, see Major Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Non-
Deployable: The Court-Martial System in Combat from 2001 to 2009, ARMY LAW., Sep.
2010. at 12.
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Though mediation is indeed different from traditional disciplinary
actions and processes, the overarching theme is the same: leadership
involved in the day-to-day conduct and relationships between Soldiers.
Consequently, mediation-just as any option expressly provided for in the
MCM-is a process that augments and reinforces the ability to lead Soldiers
effectively.
6. The Redundant Argument: Mediation Encroaches on Equal
Opportunity (EO) and Inspector General (IG) Services
The CAMP scheme is distinguishable from EO. EO programs are
designed to maximize fair employment practices and prevent or mitigate the
effects of discrimination and harassment based on race, color, religion,
gender, and national origin.199 While there is clear overlap with the CAMP
in the sense of improving professional and personal relationships among
Soldiers, the CAMP is not limited to the context of unlawful discrimination
and workplace harassment. Rather, for command-identified disputes,
mediation serves as an alternative tool for promoting good order and
discipline, much the same way that an Article 15 or written counseling
statement does so without being limited to the context of discrimination and
harassment.
The EO experts at units are trained in using multiple resources,
techniques, and approaches to resolve interpersonal conflicts, including
direct confrontation between the victim and offense, using a third party to act
as an arbiter or spokesperson, and referral to the chain-of-command. 200 If a
complaint is raised through a unit-level EO resource, one additional way to
resolve the matter informally could be through mediation. In this way,
experts in EO could serve, in appropriate situations, as screeners for cases
ripe for mediation. Rather than being redundant, CAMP can be seen as an
additional solution for EO conflicts.
For similar reasons, CAMP is distinguishable from IG. The IG serves a
complementary, but not analogous, function to dispute mediation. The IG
process identifies a problem without pushing it up through the chain-of-
command in the same way that self-identified disputes can access neutral
mediation under a proposed CAMP. The Army's IG mission has three
199 AR 600-20, Chapter 6.
200 AR 600-20, 7-7 and Appendix D.
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objectives: serve as an extension of the commander; serve as a problem-
solver; and serve as an impartial fact-finder to resolve individual complaints
about fraud, waste, and abuse.201 Mediation, in contrast, is designed to
provide the disputing parties themselves a platform for identifying the nature
of the conflict and for figuring out a way to solve it with a neutral third party.
In this way, mediators are not problem-solvers themselves; rather they are
problem-crystallizers or discussion-facilitators. Furthermore, mediators are
neutral and independent resources for commanders and Soldiers, not an
extension of the command team itself.
Finally, mediation itself is not a fact-finding mission. The disputing
parties know, or think they know, the nature of their interpersonal conflict
but lack either the empathy or willingness needed to resolve it through their
own problem-solving attempts. No party is entitled to a discovery phase
before or during the mediation. The mediation process itself is a form of
"discovery" but is generally less concerned with the actus reus and mens rea
of a particular offense and more with feelings and reactions to interpersonal
conduct: the impact or wedge splintering a recoupable relationship. In other
words, facts are important as the justifications for or explanations of
behavior, but not in the sense of discovering new evidence to use against one
or all of the parties as "evidence."
V. CONCLUSION
Though mediation has never been analyzed as a potential partner to
orthodox military justice, it need not be easily dismissed. It is neither
logistically implausible, nor contrary to established customary assumptions
about the nature of military justice and the proper role of commanders within
that system. Instead, mediation demonstrates unquestionable potential under
certain (easily-met) conditions: when presented as another application of a
commander's traditional judicial power, when used in the context of
resolving relational misconduct that has a disruptive "community effect," and
when the ultimate purpose-weighed against other traditional factors-is to
regain or repair unit cohesion. Under those conditions, mediation-whether
in a form similar to the model presented here as "CAMP," or in a less-formal
pedagogical practice-offers commanders a viable leadership and preventive
law tool that deserves further examination and trial by practice.
201 See Office of the Inspector General, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
http://www.daig.pentagon.mil/.
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Appendix A
MEDIATION OFFER
-COMMANDER'S SCRIPT-
COMMAND-IDENTIFIED DISPUTES
[To Commander: Have the disputing Soldiers report to you individually for
this offer. Be receptive to any concerns with mediation identified by the
Soldier(s) and be prepared to abort the offer in favor of other recourses (wait;
initiate Art 15; impose administrative corrective measures; conduct formal
counseling, etc.)]
For each disputing Soldier, read:
RANK, Name, this conference is to inform you that I am offering you
and [names of the other disputing Soldiers] a chance to participate in the
Commander's Alternative Mediation Program. This is not a formal
Article 15 reading, nor is it a formal counseling. [If applicable] As your
commander, I am authorized to initiate or recommend punishment under the
UCMJ and the MCM, for the following misconduct:
[Read summary of facts that would support imposing an Art 15: who, what,
when, where, relevant UCMJ punitive articles, etc.]
This offer to refer your dispute to mediation is a step before this
command considers imposition of other discipline, to include Nonjudicial
punishment under Article 15. In other words, I have not yet decided to
initiate such discipline or pursue other forms of corrective action.
First, let me briefly describe this program:
Mediation is a closed-door session with you, [name(s) of other disputing
Soldier(s)], and neutral mediator from outside this command and sponsored
by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, [unit higher headquarters]. No one
from this chain-of-command, or this command's legal support team, will
participate in the mediation; we will not advise or recommend results to
the mediator at any time. It is simply a chance to sit down for a dedicated
time to try to work out your issues, complaints, or grievances with [name(s)
of other disputing Soldier(s)] with the help of a trained mediator. The
mediator's role is in helping you to discuss and better understand your
dispute or conflict, and in helping you determine the best way to resolve it.
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The mediator's function is not to recommend or impose solution on you,
or to recommend a solution to me.
The mediation session, if you choose it, will occur at [location]. This
command will coordinate with the [Higher HQ OSJA, or office which
maintains the pool of mediators] to ensure the session begins no later than 7
calendar days from the day you agree to mediate.
I am offering this mediation alternative because I believe it is in your
best interest as you attempt to resolve your dispute. This offer is neither an
entitlement nor a required action before this command imposes or initiates
administrative and/or punitive actions under the UCMJ.
You have 48 hours to decide whether to accept or reject this offer.
During that time, you may consult with counsel from Trial Defense Service,
or civilian counsel at no expense to the government. However, because
mediation is not an adjudicative procedure-that is, it will not result in a
punishment or disciplinary administrative consequence-you are not
entitled to have counsel present during the mediation session. You may
advise me of your choice any time within the 48-hour period.
As commander, I retain the authority to terminate the mediation at any
time prior to the beginning of the mediation session for good cause shown,
or-upon the recommendation of the mediator-during the mediation.
Upon prior request and approval from both the mediator and [name(s) of
other disputing Soldiers], you may have counsel or other support person
present during the mediation. This counsel or support person will not speak
for you, nor represent you, at the mediation session.
The mediation session can last as long as you feel comfortable
participating in it, with the objective of working toward a written dispute
settlement agreement signed by you and [name(s) of the other disputing
Soldier(s)]. In other words, there is no time limit on the process. If an
agreement is reached, the mediator will draft the written agreement and
forward the signed agreement to me.
Subject matter discussed during the session is confidential and will not
be disclosed (even to this command) unless all disputing Soldiers and the
mediator consent. However, any statement or conduct indicating a threat to
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commit, attempt to commit, or actual committing of a crime, or concealing of
ongoing criminal activity, automatically waives this rule.
Upon reviewing the agreement, I will ensure that it comports with Army
laws and regulations, and promotes military justice in a reasonable effort to
resolve your dispute. As commander, I retain the authority to terminate
the Agreement at any time if it fails to meet these goals, and reconsider
initiating UCMJ discipline or administrative corrective measures. I may also
offer to refer this case to a new mediator if I believe that the process, if
renewed, has a significant chance of achieving an appropriate resolution. I
will inform you of my approval or disapproval within 48 hours of receiving
the mediation agreement.
If I accept your Agreement, the parties to the Agreement will each
maintain a copy, as will I. I retain the authority to brief my chain-of-
command, subordinate leaders, and command legal team on the outcome as
necessary. No other party, including the mediator, will retain a copy of the
Agreement.
Finally, it may helpful to think of mediation as period to "cool off" while
constructively working to a resolution. If you participate in mediation in
good faith, you and [name(s) of other disputing Soldier(s)] have the chance
to shape what happens next.
Do you understand that I am offering you this mediation referral because
I believe it is in your best interest and the most effective way to resolve your
dispute at this time?
Do you understand that I am not ordering you to participate in mediation,
and that I've made no suggestion that I will impose UCMJ punishment or
administrative corrective measures if you choose not to participate or fail to
reach a mediated settlement agreement?
Do you understand that any agreement you make with [name(s) of other
disputing Soldier(s)] is subject to my final approval?
484
[Vol. 28:2 2013]
MILITARY MEDIATION AS MILITARY JUSTICE?
Do you understand that participation in mediation is an entirely voluntary
choice, and that you have an opportunity to consider what I have said today
before making your decision?
Do you wish to make a decision now, or consider this offer further?
[To Commander:]
If they accept the offer immediately, make the same offer to remaining
disputing Soldier(s) individually. If they wish to consider the offer further,
give them the "Agreement to Mediate" form and instruct them not to sign it
until you personally brief them again with the other assenting Soldier(s).
Upon oral agreement to mediate by all disputing Soldier(s) (either at this
conference or within 48 hours), reconvene a joint conference with all
disputing Soldiers present, and have them read the "Agreement to Mediate. "
If you are satisfied that each Soldier understands the Agreement and is
voluntarily participating, have them sign a single Agreement. Give each
Soldier a copy of the signed Agreement to Mediate, and instruct them to
standby for the date, time, location of the mediation session, and that it will
be their assigned place ofduty.
Contact the Commander's Alternative Mediation Program (CAMP)
coordinator at ### - ### - #### to schedule the session. The session should
occur within 7 days of the date of the signed "Agreement to Mediate."
Contact the disputing Soldiers and inform them of their appointed place
of duty, time, and uniform for the mediation session.
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Appendix B
* DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, [UNIT]
[Higher unit and Installation]
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
UNIT SYMBOL
DATE
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Agreement to Mediate
1. The undersigned Soldiers hereby:
a. Agree to participate in command-referred mediation, known as the
Commander's Alternative Mediation Program; the undersigned Soldiers
enter into this "Agreement to Mediate" voluntarily, and have not been
coerced, pressured, or intimidated in any manner in making this decision.
b. Acknowledge that no one from this chain-of-command, or this
command's legal support team, will participate in the mediation, and will not
advise or recommend results to the mediator at any time regarding our
dispute.
c. Acknowledge having received individual, personal briefings by a
commander authorized to impose nonjudicial punishment under Article 15,
UCMJ, and were provided with 48 hours to consider the offer of a mediation
referral.
d. Acknowledge that there is no entitlement to mediation, or to receive
an offer to mediate, as a prerequisite to command-directed administrative or
punitive actions concerning the facts of this conflict or dispute.
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e. Acknowledge that there is no entitlement to consulting or
representative counsel for this mediation, and that any request to have
counsel or a support person present during the mediation must be approved
by the mediator and all disputing parties in advance.
f. Understand that any mediated Agreement will comport with Army
polices, regulations,. and the UCMJ, and will represent a reasonable effort to
resolve our dispute; we acknowledge that the undersigned commander is
final approving authority for the terms of the mediated Agreement, if any.
g. Acknowledge that any mediated Agreement does not restrict, limit,
or otherwise confine the undersigned commander's authority to terminate the
Agreement for good cause and initiate punitive or administrative corrective
measures.
h. Understand that the subject matter discussed during the mediation
session is confidential and will not be disclosed without written consent by
all parties, including the mediator.
i. Acknowledge that no party to this dispute may be forced to enter into
a mediated settlement Agreement, and that failure to arrive at a mediated
settlement Agreement does not automatically trigger administrative or
punitive action by the command.
2. This "Agreement to Mediate" shall not be construed or
interpreted as a legally-enforceable contract between or among the
undersigned Soldiers and commander. However, failure by disputing
Soldier(s) to adhere to this Agreement to Mediate in good faith may reflect
adversely on an ability or willingness to resolve this dispute and-as a
consequence-may be used by the commander in future evaluation and
disposition of the facts underlying this dispute.
3. Any mediated settlement Agreement entered into by the parties
during the mediation session, regardless of commander approval, shall
not be construed or interpreted as a legally enforceable contract between
or among the signatories. However, failure by one or more of the disputing
Soldier(s) to adhere to the terms contained therein may be used by the
commander in future evaluation and disposition of the facts underlying this
dispute.
487
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Ifmore signature blocks are needed, handwrite below]
Print NAME, RANK:
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
Print NAME, RANK:
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
Signature
Name
Rank, Branch
Commanding
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Appendix C
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, [UNIT]
[Higher unit and Installation]
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
OFFICE SYMBOL
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Mediated Agreement
1. The undersigned Soldiers hereby agree (enumerate each specific
agreement below):
2. The undersigned Soldiers hereby understand, acknowledge, and
agree that:
a. The undersigned Soldiers entered into this "Mediation Agreement"
voluntarily, and have not been coerced, pressured, or intimidated in any
manner in making this Agreement.
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b. No one from this chain-of-command, or this command's legal
support team, participated in the mediation, and did not advise or recommend
results to the mediator at any time regarding our dispute to the best of our
knowledge.
c. To the best of our knowledge, this Agreement comports with Army
polices, regulations, and the UCMJ, and represents a reasonable effort to
resolve our dispute; we acknowledge that the referring commander is final
approving authority for the terms of this mediated Agreement.
d. This Agreement does not restrict, limit, or otherwise confine the
referring commander's authority to terminate this Agreement for good cause
and initiate punitive or administrative corrective measures.
e. This Agreement, regardless of commander approval, shall not be
construed or interpreted as a legally-enforceable contract between or
among the signatories and referring commander and that failure by one or
more of the undersigned Soldier(s) to adhere to the terms contained therein
may be used by the commander in future evaluation and disposition of the
facts underlying this dispute.
[If more signature blocks are needed, handwrite below]
Print NAME, RANK:
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
Print NAME, RANK:
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
[FULL NAME], Mediator
[Rank, Branch]
Date
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